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Abstract
A persistent wage gap exists between women and men in the United States
(Catalyst, 2015; Hegewisch, Ellis, & Hartmann, 2015). Although the reasons
behind the wage gap are extremely complex, one of the methods through which
pay equity may be reached could involve altering the way people approach their
goals at the bargaining table, especially since women tend to underperform
relative to men in salary negotiations (Mazei, Hüffmeier, Freund, Stuhlmacher,
Bilke, & Hertel, 2015). Salary negotiations represent a critical piece of the pay
equity puzzle, particularly when individuals are starting their careers. If equally
qualified men and women begin their careers negotiating different starting
salaries, what may begin as a small difference in pay snowballs to a significant
difference in lifetime earnings, and that does not account for other factors like
promotions or bonuses. The present study found evidence that supports the use of
a motivational intervention for salary negotiations derived from regulatory focus
theory (RFT) to reduce gender differences in salary negotiation outcomes.
Specifically, women in the role of a job candidate who were told to consciously
frame a salary negotiation as an opportunity and instructed to use an eagerness
strategy (i.e., focus on attaining one’s aspiration salary value) achieved better
negotiated outcomes (i.e., first offer, starting salary) compared to a condition
where no specific strategy was assigned. There was also a main effect of the
eagerness strategy on first offers and final negotiated salary. The current research
also integrated the existing literature on gender differences in negotiation. Women
in the eagerness strategy condition anticipated less backlash (i.e., social penalties
1

due to violations of traditional gender role norms) for negotiating compared to the
control condition. Lastly, priming job candidates’ regulatory strategy (i.e.,
eagerness strategy versus control condition) was tested for its role in subjective
outcomes such as feelings of satisfaction with the negotiation and perceptions of
one’s counterpart. Individuals in the eagerness strategy condition did not differ in
their satisfaction with negotiated outcomes (i.e., salary), the negotiation process,
perceptions of their own competence, and perceptions of their counterpart
compared to the control condition.

2

Introduction
Negotiation represents a process that occurs in a variety of contexts.
Individuals engage in negotiation when they discuss their salary and benefits at a
new job, bargain with sellers at antique shows, conduct business-to-business
transactions, and allocate domestic responsibilities. As such, it is important that
people are effective at conducting negotiations, whether they be formal or
informal, to attain desired goals and outcomes.
An area of increasing research concerns the role of self-regulation as a
mechanism through which negotiators execute their bargaining strategy and
achieve their goals (Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & Mussweiler, 2005;
Appelt, Zou, Arora, & Higgins, 2009; Appelt & Higgins, 2010). Broadly, selfregulation comprises a set of cognitive processes that guide an individual’s
thoughts, behaviors, and emotions while pursuing desired end states, or goals
(Bandura, 1991; Kanfer, 1990). Within the last decade, negotiation scholars have
begun examining the role of regulatory focus, which describes the manner in
which individuals pursue their goals using either approach focused mindsets that
view tasks as opportunities for advancement and growth, thus framing the pursuit
of goals in terms of gains, or avoidance focused mindsets that view tasks as
responsibilities, duties, or obligations and thus frame goal pursuit in terms of
avoiding losses (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998; Higgins, Friedman,
Harlow, Idson, Ayduk, & Taylor, 2001). Recent research applying regulatory
focus to negotiation has found that there may be general advantages to adopting
the gain framing common to the promotion focus, while the loss avoidance
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strategy common to the prevention focus could be advantageous under different
circumstances (e.g., individuals have very high goals) (Galinsky et al., 2005;
Trotschel et al., 2013). One interesting arena where some theories of selfregulation have been applied but have yet to incorporate recent developments in
the literature concerns gender differences in negotiation.
Women in particular may benefit from an intervention that could alleviate
distractions to goal pursuit during negotiation. Since women still only hold 5.2%
of Fortune 500 CEO positions and are only earning an estimated $0.82 for every
dollar paid to men, organizations and scholars alike must consider opportunities to
help qualified women achieve equal outcomes relative to their male counterparts
(Catalyst, 2017; Hegewisch, Ellis, & Hartmann, 2015). Women do not report
setting any less ambitious career goals compared to men, yet they are less likely
to hold senior management positions, have people directly reporting to them, and
report feeling less satisfied with their careers compared to men (Ely, Stone, &
Ammerman, 2014).
Women’s lower average performance in salary negotiations compared to
men is often cited as a contributing factor to the gender pay gap (Amanatullah &
Tinsley, 2013; Bowles & McGinn, 2008; Kulik & Olekalns, 2012; Mazei et al.,
2015). One of the biggest reasons why a self-regulation intervention may be
preferable to other interventions is that women are not overtly instructed to alter
their behavior in any way. Rather, the way in which individuals are instructed to
pursue their goals is manipulated such that women’s tendency to fear or avoid
stereotypically masculine-typed negotiations (e.g., salary negotiation) can be
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reduced by changing the way negotiation strategies are framed. The current
research differs from other interventions to reduce gender differences in
negotiation, which have largely placed the burden on women negotiators to adjust
their behavior. In one study, Amanatullah and Morris (2010) found that women
who use assertive bargaining tactics receive harsher social penalties (i.e.,
backlash) and negotiate worse deals compared to women who negotiate using
more relational tactics (i.e., negotiating on behalf of someone). The authors’
advice for women was to enhance the perception of the advocacy role across
negotiations by couching requests in terms of how it may benefit others (e.g., the
organization, subordinates). Others have recommended that women “lean in” and
negotiate more often, defying traditional female prescriptions for behavior by
enhancing their ambition and commitment (Babcock & Laschever, 2003;
Sandberg, 2013).
Negotiation
Negotiation can be defined as the “deliberate interactions of two or more
complex social units which are attempting to define or redefine the terms of their
interdependence” (Walton & McKersie, 1965, p. 3) or “the process by which
people with conflicting interests determine how they are going to allocate
resources or work together in the future” (Brett, 2007, p. 1). A key trait of
negotiations is that they are inherently interdependent (or perceived as such),
meaning that the desires or goals of one party influence what the other party can
have, and vice versa. Negotiation is an especially compelling research topic given
that it has applications in both formal (e.g., negotiating roles for a new work
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project) and informal settings (e.g., negotiating household chores), meaning that
most people will be engaged in a negotiation during some time in their lives, and
would benefit from understanding how to negotiate successfully (Pruitt &
Carnevale, 1993). However, there are a few core characteristics that define
negotiation differently from other forms of conflict resolution. Specifically,
negotiations involve parties (i.e., individuals or groups) that have, or perceive to
have, conflicts of interest, are engaged in communication (face-to-face or other
mediums), are able to make compromises by making offers and counteroffers to
one another, are part of a negotiation voluntarily (i.e., not by coercion), the
parties’ outcomes are determined jointly, and mixed-motives exist such that both
parties’ are motivated to compete for their own best interest as well as cooperate
with one another (Rubin & Brown, 1975; Schelling, 1960). At a more granular
level, negotiations are defined as either distributive or integrative in terms of their
structure.
Distributive versus integrative negotiations
One critical distinction made in negotiation research is the structure as
either distributive or integrative. In distributive negotiations, the interests of the
negotiating parties are in direct opposition to one another, where the gains
achieved by one party are directly proportional to the losses incurred by their
counterpart (de Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007; Walton & McKersie,
1965). One example of a distributive negotiation would be a buyer-seller, singleissue structure for the price of a car. The price that the seller receives for the car is
directly proportional to the money the buyer must spend (i.e., lose). Contrary to
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distributive negotiations, integrative negotiations typically involve multiple issues
where negotiators’ interests may still be opposed, but the priorities may differ
across topics and trade-offs are possible (Walton & McKersie, 1965).
In a classic example of an integrative negotiation, two sisters are
discussing who should get an orange, eventually agreeing to split the orange in
half; each sister throwing out the part of the orange they didn’t want (Follett,
1924). At first blush, it would appear that this is a distributive negotiation (i.e., if
one sister gets the orange, the other gets nothing; therefore, the best option would
be to split the orange in half to distribute the resource evenly). However, if the
sisters had negotiated effectively, they would have discovered that one wanted the
rind of the orange for its zest in making a cake, while the other wanted the inside
of the fruit for juice. To truly maximize the distribution of the resource (i.e., the
orange), and get what they truly desired (i.e., the rind or the fruit itself,
respectively), the sisters would have needed to communicate openly to identify
their positions and interests.
As you can imagine, many real-world negotiations are integrative in
nature, but may not be perceived as such by the parties involved due the strong
tendency to believe that most negotiation scenarios involve a finite set of goods or
resources, and therefore one party’s gain is the other’s loss. This is called the
“fixed-pie bias” (de Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Thompson & Hastie, 1990).
The fixed-pie bias can create a set of expectations that lead negotiators to engage
in ineffective negotiation tactics that may lead to impasse (i.e., no deal), or an
inefficient distribution of resources like the story of the sisters and the orange.
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Negotiated agreements can therefore be evaluated as Pareto efficient, no other
agreement exists that would make either party better off without sacrificing
outcomes of the other parties involved, or Pareto inefficient, where there are
unexplored alternative deals that would benefit one party without hurting the
other (Raiffa, Richardson, & Metcalfe, 2002).
One setting where negotiation skills are often put to the test in a highstakes environment is in salary negotiations. In salary negotiations, newly hired
employees must balance their desire to maximize their starting salary while
minimizing the potential of offending their new employer by coming across as too
demanding. On the other side of the table, employers must maximize their desire
to satisfy the new employee’s desire for a competitive salary while minimizing
consequences for a salary that is too high. Individuals involved in salary
negotiations may possess a reservation value; the minimum salary the employee
would accept or the maximum salary the employer would offer, the target value;
the salary both employee and employer would respectively view as acceptable,
and the aspiration value; the maximum salary the employee would like to receive
or the minimum salary the employer would like to offer (Walton & McKersie,
1965). In setting these values, both parties decide on a value that would constitute
their opening offer during the negotiation. The opening offer could be different
from the reservation, target, or aspiration values, but is typically more effective
when it is close to the aspiration value (de Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef,
2007). One other value that may affect a salary negotiation is the BATNA (i.e.,
best alternative to a negotiated agreement), for example, another job offer (for the
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candidate) or job candidate (for the hiring manager) exists. Negotiators often
consider their reservation, target, and aspiration values in conjunction with their
BATNA.
It is important to note that goals in negotiation go beyond economic
values, and also include subjective outcomes. For example, negotiators are more
likely to report a desire to work with their counterpart in the future when they
report feeling more satisfied with the final terms of the negotiation, trust their
counterpart, and feel their negotiation experience was a fair process (Curhan, Xu,
& Elfenbein, 2006).
Therefore, an important skill in negotiation is planning (i.e., setting goals)
and executing a strategy so negotiators can get what they desire (i.e., attain their
goals) and feel satisfied with economic and interpersonal outcomes. One area of
the literature that has been applied to understand this process is self-regulation. I
will first broadly describe self-regulation, the process that drives goal selection
and attainment, and then discuss a more specific theory of self-regulation, called
regulatory focus theory.
Self-regulation
Self-regulation, or the cognitive process through which individuals
monitor and guide their thoughts, behaviors, and emotions over time in the
selection and pursuit of goals (Bandura, 1991; Kanfer, 1990). A goal is defined as
“the object or aim of an action” (Locke & Latham, 2002, p. 705), such as the
attainment of a specific level of performance on a task within a pre-determined
amount of time. Goals direct behavior in that “they direct attention and effort
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toward goal-related activities and away from goal irrelevant activities” (Locke &
Latham, 2002, p. 705), provide an energizing function such that individuals who
set goals commit more effort towards goal-attainment, improve persistence over
time on goal-related activities, and affect cognition such that individuals are cued
to apply preexisting or closely related knowledge and skills to goal-relevant tasks
and plan strategies for goal-attainment. Self-regulation is activated when
individuals, consciously or unconsciously, recognize a discrepancy between their
current state and a desired state (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Goals are a
representation of these desired end states to the individual, and guide the focus of
self-regulatory activities (Vancouver & Day, 2005).
Although theoretical descriptions of the forces that activate and perpetuate
self-regulation differ, they typically include the interdependent concepts of goal
choice and goal striving. Goal choice is a process through which individuals
select one or more goals whereas goal striving is the process through which
individuals engage in the execution of strategies in the pursuit of attaining the
goals they set (Diefendorff & Lord, 2008). Other researchers have broken down
goal choice into the distinct processes of goal establishment (i.e., the adoption,
adaptation, or rejection of goals) and planning (i.e., the preparation to pursue a
goal) (Vancouver & Day, 2005). Lastly, goal revision, or the process of changing
or abandoning goals, may be utilized as goal pursuit unfolds across time and
contexts (Austin & Vancouver, 1996).
Theoretical frameworks developed to describe self-regulation have
generally fallen into three camps: structure, phase, and content (Diefendorff &
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Lord, 2008). Content theories of self-regulation, of which this research focuses
(i.e., regulatory focus theory), are not as interested in specific mechanisms
through which self-regulation occurs but rather how the activities or goals that
individuals pursue affects self-regulatory processes and outcomes (c.f., Grant &
Dweck, 1990). The current research emphasizes a theory from this family:
Regulatory focus theory (i.e., RFT). In the following sections, I will describe
regulatory focus theory and how it has been examined within the context of
negotiation.
Regulatory focus theory
Regulatory focus theory (RFT) is a content theory of self-regulation that
serves to explain the mechanisms through which individuals monitor their
cognition, affect, and behavior during goal striving (Higgins, 1997; Higgins,
1998; Higgins et al., 2001). This operates through two coexisting concepts:
Promotion focus and prevention focus. Both foci relate to approach motivation
wherein individuals strive to reduce the gap between their current and desired
states. RFT states that a single task in which an individual sets a goal may be
accomplished through the employment of strategies that reflect either promotion
or prevention focus. In general, promotion focused individuals ensure goal
achievement while accomplishing gains while prevention focused individuals
ensure goal achievement while minimizing losses. As an example, two
individuals may set the same goal (e.g., to receive an A in a college course), but
one may view this goal as an opportunity to improve their class rank (i.e.,
promotion focus) and utilize eagerness strategies (e.g., focusing on studying
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course materials), while the other views this goal as a requirement to maintain
their standing in a degree program (i.e., prevention focus) and utilize vigilance
strategies (e.g., minimizing information that is forgotten) to accomplish the goal.
A promotion focus theoretically stems from a desire for individuals to
fulfill nurturance needs. Nurturance needs represent an individual’s needs for
growth, achievement, and accomplishment. Promotion focused goals typically
revolve around ideals (i.e., hopes and aspirations) and opportunities for personal
growth. Additionally, a promotion focus is a motivational condition that drives
goal striving behaviors based on the presence and absence of positive outcomes.
Promotion focused individuals adopt goal-striving strategies that are characterized
by “eagerness” behaviors (e.g., working consistently on project tasks,
accumulating points in a game) (Higgins, 1997, Higgins et al., 2001).
A prevention focus stems from a desire to fulfill security needs. Security
needs represent an individual’s desire to fulfill their desires for protection, safety,
and responsibility (i.e., the “ought” self). Individuals with a prevention focus
concentrate on ought goals that are related to duties, responsibilities, and
obligations. A prevention focus drives goal-striving behaviors based on the
presence and absence of negative or undesired outcomes. Prevention focused
individuals adopt goal-striving strategies that are characterized by “vigilance”
behaviors (e.g., avoiding work that is unrelated to the current project, making as
few errors as possible) (Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998; Higgins et al., 2001).
Individuals can be primed to adopt a prevention or promotion focus based
on situational framing (Higgins et al., 2001). For example, an individual may be
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generally prevention focused, but primed for a promotion focus while playing a
video game where ideal, promotion-focused goals are set (e.g., accumulating a
certain number of experience points to get to a new level in the game), and
players are instructed to attain these goals by going on missions that help them
achieve experience points (i.e., utilize eagerness strategies).
A second important factor in RFT relates to the concept of regulatory fit,
which suggests that congruence between chronic regulatory focus and the manner
in which a goal is pursued enhance goal pursuit and task performance.
Regulatory fit
Based on RFT, a promotion focused individual enacts eagerness strategies
during goal pursuit while a prevention focused individual enacts vigilance
strategies. However, what happens when a promotion focused individual enacts a
vigilance strategy (i.e., attain non-loss over a loss) or a prevention focused
individual enacts an eagerness (i.e., attain gains over non-gains) strategy, either
due to the salience of norms in a goal striving context or through direct
instructions? According to regulatory fit theory, a direct offshoot of regulatory
focus theory, individuals experience fit, a sensation of “feeling right”, when there
is a match between their regulatory focus orientation (i.e., promotion or
prevention) and the manner of pursuing a goal using eagerness or vigilance
strategies. Fit is enhanced for promotion focused individuals when they pursue
goals using an eagerness compared to vigilance strategy, whereas prevention
focused individuals experience greater fit when they employ a vigilance compared
to an eagerness strategy (Higgins, 2000). This feeling of fit increases the
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perceived value of goal pursuit and intensifies goal pursuit (Cesario, Grant, &
Higgins, 2004; Higgins, 2000; Higgins 2006). For example, Freitas and
colleagues (2002) demonstrated that participants experienced greater task
engagement (i.e., the extent to which participants thought a task was interesting
and enjoyable) when the task instructions denoted fit with their chronic regulatory
focus; promotion focused participants were more engaged when the task involved
circling matching shapes (i.e., a task that elicits an eagerness strategy) versus
crossing out mismatched shapes (i.e., a task that elicits a vigilance strategy) while
prevention focused participants were more engaged when the task involved
crossing out mismatched shapes versus circling matching shapes (Freitas,
Liberman, Salovey, & Higgins, 2002). Regulatory fit also positively influences
task performance, goal completion, and subjective feelings of satisfaction (Keller
& Bless, 2006; Park, Van Dyne, & Ilgen, 2013; Spiegel, Grant-Pillow, & Higgins,
2004).
RFT in organizational psychology. In a meta-analysis by Lanaj, Chang,
and Johnson (2012), the role of regulatory focus was examined within an
organizational context as a mediating process that links more distal factors such as
goal orientation and personality to work-related outcomes such as task
performance and organizational citizenship behaviors (i.e., OCBs). This comes
from recommendations suggesting that distal traits predict performance through
self-regulatory processes (Kanfer, 1990; 1992). Regulatory focus was examined
meta-analytically and explained incremental variance in task performance after
controlling for nine other predictors (learning goal orientation, performance-
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approach goal orientation, performance-avoid goal orientation, self-efficacy,
conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, openness, agreeableness). These
nine predictors explained 41% of the variance in task performance. Regulatory
focus explained an additional 13% of the variance in task performance.
Regulatory focus was also ranked the fourth most predictive variable for task
performance in terms of relative importance, following conscientiousness, selfefficacy, and learning goal orientation.
Specifically, Lanaj et al., (2012) found that a promotion focus is positively
associated with approach temperaments, including extraversion (= .36), positive
affectivity (= .39), the behavioral activation system (= .45), learning goal
orientation (= .47), performance approach goal orientation (= .40), and selfefficacy (= .24). Promotion focus was also positively associated with task
performance (= .38), OCBs (i.e., organizational citizenship behaviors) (= .30),
and innovative performance (= .28).
Prevention focus was positively associated with avoidance temperaments,
such as neuroticism (= .21), negative affectivity (= .23), behavioral inhibition
system (= .39), and performance-avoid goal orientation (=.26). Prevention
focus was also positively associated with conscientiousness (= .32), and safety
performance (= .51).
Promotion and prevention foci are theoretically distinct and statistically
orthogonal to one another rather than two ends of a single, bipolar continuum
(Higgins, 1997). Theoretically, an individual could, on average across situations,
utilize vigilance (prevention) and eagerness (promotion) strategies during goal
15

attainment, although this effect has not yet been empirically tested. Similar to
non-linear or curvilinear relationships found in other research (c.f., Ferris et al.,
2011), there may be a number of work-related contexts where a focus on both
prevention and promotion would yield optimal outcomes. Indeed, one of the
strongest statistical relationships with both promotion and prevention focus in the
meta-analysis by Lanaj, Chang, and Johnson (2012) was conscientiousness, a Big
5 personality variable that consistently predicts important work-based outcomes
such as task performance. Therefore, when both approach and avoidance-oriented
goal strategies are employed, motivation strength and performance may be
optimized (Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001; McCrae & Lockenhoff, 2010).
In relation to regulatory fit, Wallace and Chen (2006) found that a
promotion focus enabled productivity when operationalized as working quickly,
but was negatively related to safety performance, operationalized as compliance
with safety-related rules and regulations. A prevention focus resulted in higher
safety performance but lowered productivity. Similarly, a study by Crowe and
Higgins (1997) found that prevention-focused participants outperformed
promotion-focused participants on a task requiring accuracy, whereas promotionfocused participants outperformed prevention-focused participants on a task
requiring creative solutions.
Regulatory focus theory in negotiation
RFT has been applied to negotiation research within the last decade,
consistent with the broader trend to incorporate theories of self-regulation in the
organizational psychology literature. Regulatory focus research in negotiation has
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examined its effects on several negotiation variables, including self-set goals (e.g.,
reservation, aspiration, or target value), opening first offers, size and frequency of
concessions, and economic outcomes (e.g., value claimed by individual
negotiators, value created at the dyad level). Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen,
and Mussweiler (2005) examined the role of regulatory focus within the context
of goal striving in negotiations. In Study 1, the authors found that recruiters with
a chronic promotion focus achieved better outcomes for themselves (i.e., the
agreed-upon salary for the candidate was lower) in a two-party, distributive salary
negotiation compared to chronically prevention focused individuals (r = -.40, p
< .05). Promotion focus led to a stronger focus on target values (r=.44, p < .05) in
the negotiation compared to prevention focus; however, this was only examined
for individuals in the recruiter role. In Study 2, negotiators with a promotion focus
made more extreme, self-serving opening offers compared to prevention focused
negotiators; this effect was also examined only for those in a buyer role. In the
last study, Galinsky and colleagues (2005) demonstrated that dyads with a
collective promotion focus were more likely to achieve Pareto efficient outcomes
compared to dyads with a collective prevention focus in an integrative bargaining
scenario.
Regulatory fit has also been examined within the context of negotiations
to explain the tendency for negotiators in certain roles, namely buyer or seller, to
utilize different strategies. Appelt, Zou, Arora, and Higgins (2009) found an effect
for role as a buyer or seller on strategies employed during negotiation and
perceptions of fit with the buyer or seller role. They suggested that buyers tended
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to experience fit when they adopted a prevention focus due to the desire to ensure
non-loss against loss (i.e., pay as little as possible) whereas sellers experience fit
when they adopt a promotion focus due to the desire to ensure gains against nongains (i.e., receive the highest price). Appelt and Higgins (2010) measured
participants’ regulatory focus (i.e., promotion or prevention), and manipulated
their strategy (i.e., eagerness or vigilance) and role (i.e. buyer or seller) in a
distributive price negotiation to examine the influence of fit on negotiated
outcomes. Specifically, they measured the influence of focus-strategy fit and rolestrategy fit, finding that buyers and prevention-focused individuals felt greater fit
when utilizing vigilance strategies, while sellers and promotion-focused
individuals felt greater fit when utilizing eagerness strategies. Negotiators
experiencing fit planned to make more demanding offers. Additionally, men were
more likely to adopt gain frames (i.e., view the negotiation as an opportunity to
create value, minimize loss, attain resources, and maintain resources),
experienced greater subjective feelings of fit, and planned to make higher
demands compared to women (Appelt & Higgins, 2010).
The prevention-focused buyer and promotion-focused seller finding stands
in line with previous research that has found buyers focus on the money they must
pay as a loss versus sellers, who focus on the money to be received as a gain
(Carmon & Ariely, 2000; Monga & Zhu, 2005; Neale et al., 1987). Subsequently,
buyers and sellers frame negotiations differently. Similarly, recruiters or
employers are potentially prevention-focused while candidates are promotionfocused within the context of salary negotiations (Galinsky et al., 2005). As such,
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the negotiator role dictates the strategy choices; namely, buyers will adopt a
vigilance strategy that ensures non-losses (i.e., spending only as much money as
is necessary) while sellers will adopt an eagerness strategy that ensures gains (i.e.,
receiving as much money as possible) (Higgins, 2000). Therefore, buyers’ goal
of minimizing losses is optimized by a vigilant strategy, while sellers’ goal of
maximizing gains is optimized by an eagerness strategy.
Building on this research, Shalvi and colleagues (2013) found an
interesting effect such that buyers who are chronically prevention focused are
more averse to engaging in negotiation compared to promotion focused buyers;
prevention focused buyers were significantly more likely than promotion focused
buyers to exit a negotiation when confronted with a simulated counterpart that
engaged in a tough negotiation strategy (i.e., was less willing to concede and
made demanding offers) compared to a soft strategy. However, when prevention
focused buyers were informed of the potential for integrative agreements, they
were more likely to reach mutually beneficial negotiated agreements compared to
promotion focused buyers. Additionally, Trötschel and colleagues (2013) used a
distributive price negotiation established from prior research (c.f., Galinsky et al.,
2005) and found that prevention focused parties who set high goals were more
resistant to concession-making compared to their promotion focused counterparts,
regardless of whether the counterpart held high or low goals.
More nuanced than broad meta-analytic evidence about regulatory focus
on performance (c.f., Lanaj, Chang, & Johnson, 2012), negotiation research might
suggest that chronically prevention focused individuals are at an advantage as a
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seller in distributive buyer-seller negotiations. However, Ten Velden, Beersma,
and de Dreu (2009) offer a slightly different take on regulatory focus theory by
contextualizing promotion and prevention focus to negotiation in their
operationalization of negotiator motivation. Specifically, they defined appetitive
competitors, who are motivated to win from their counterpart, a relative gain,
versus aversive competitors, who are motivated to avoid losing from their
counterpart (a relative non-loss). These concepts are distinct from promotion
focus and prevention focus because appetitive and aversive competition specify
desired end states (i.e., winning or not losing to the counterpart) whereas
regulatory foci do not, although they are generally characterized by a concern for
accomplishment and obtaining a positive event (i.e., promotion focus) or safety
and avoiding a negative event (i.e., prevention focus). Ten Velden et al. (2009)
found a main effect such that aversive competitors made lower initial demands
compared to appetitive competitors in a buyer-seller negotiation, and this effect
was mediated by feelings of anxiety. Based on earlier research (c.f., Ten Velden,
Beersma, & de Dreu, 2008), aversive competitors are more likely to settle than
appetitive competitors and are more likely to feel satisfied by an even split in a
negotiation compared to appetitive competitors.
Collectively, this research suggests that negotiators’ chronic regulatory
focus can influence negotiated outcomes such that promotion focused individuals
achieve better negotiated outcomes, likely through more demanding initial offers
and lower resistance to negotiating (Galinsky et al., 2005, Shalvi et al., 2013).
The role of a negotiator as buyer or seller (or as employer/recruiter or candidate)
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should be in line with the strategies employed (i.e., prevention focused buyers and
promotion focused sellers) to enhance perceptions of fit, which serve to increase
the magnitude of goal pursuit (Appelt et al., 2009; Appelt & Higgins, 2010).
Lastly, negotiators who are chronically prevention focused could overcome a
potential disadvantage in distributive buyer-seller negotiations by enhancing their
perception of integrative potential and setting high goals (Trötschel et al., 2013;
Ten Velden Beersma, & de Dreu, 2009). Taken together, these effects are
expected to be replicated in the current paradigm such that negotiators primed
with an eagerness strategy will attain greater economic outcomes in the form of
the final negotiated salary, make higher first offers, and report feeling more
satisfied with the negotiation. Perceptions of fit will mediate the relationship
between primed regulatory strategy and these outcomes.
One arena that RFT has not yet been applied is within the gender
differences in negotiation literature. Recent research has suggested gender
differences in the tendency to adopt gain or non-loss frames, and experiences of
regulatory fit (c.f., Appelt & Higgins, 2010). Given evidence that there are gender
differences in negotiation outcomes, especially in salary negotiations (i.e., largely
a distributive negotiation context), interventions informed by RFT seem
promising.
Gender differences in negotiation research
Gender differences in negotiation have been examined for many decades.
Stuhlmacher and Walters (1999) conducted the first meta-analysis of gender
effects in negotiation outcomes, showing a small but significant effect for a
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negotiation advantage favoring men. An update and expansion of that metaanalysis by Mazei et al. (2015) found even larger and more variable effect sizes
(ranging from Hedges g of -2.07 to g of 2.14) than the 1999 study. Situations that
were predicted to advantage men were compared to situations that were predicted
to advantage women. When women negotiators were in situations that were
favorable to the female gender role (i.e., clear bargaining range, previous
negotiation experience, negotiating on behalf of another person), their outcomes
equaled or exceeded those of male negotiators. Additional research has found
that gender differences are eliminated if negotiations are framed as a learning
situation rather than diagnostic of ability (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001) or
potential negotiations are re-framed as opportunities to “ask” rather than negotiate
(Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007). However, in situations that are
masculine-stereotyped (e.g., salary negotiations) or otherwise induce feelings of a
lack of fit with the negotiator role, women are still disadvantaged compared to
men (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bear & Babcock, 2012; Bowles & Babcock,
2013; Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007).
Amanatullah and Morris (2010) found that women’s lower outcomes in a
negotiation for entry-level salary compared to men was explained by their fear of
being judged as too demanding or aggressive, and thus violating prescriptive
gender stereotypes requiring women to be warm and agreeable (Eagly & Karau,
2002). Women are often justified in expecting these reactions to their behavior in
negotiations, as they are often penalized for engaging in assertive negotiation
tactics (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013; Bowles et al., 2007; Small et al., 2005). As
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a result, women likely experience the self-fulfilling prophecy of negotiating worse
outcomes. The existence of beliefs that women are worse negotiators compared to
men results in negotiation counterparts treating women differently, and women
end up behaving in a manner that confirms these beliefs due to the fear of
backlash for violating gender stereotypes (Kennedy & Kray, 2015). For example,
Bowles, Babcock, and Lai (2007) conducted a series of compensation negotiation
studies which revealed that female negotiators employing traditional negotiation
tactics received penalties in the context of short term outcomes where
counterparts were less likely to grant their salary requests and long-term outcomes
where counterparts reported less willingness to work with them in the future
compared male negotiators.
Gender stereotypes associate men with agentic qualities such as
competence, ambition, assertiveness, and competitiveness while women are
associated with communal qualities such as warmth, caring, emotive, and
supportive (Eagly & Kite, 1987). These stereotypes, according to social role
theory, arise from women’s traditional role as homemakers and men’s traditional
role as breadwinners, which still holds true today even as women comprise 47%
of the U.S. labor market (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). Many
negotiation contexts subsequently associate agentic qualities with success, and
characterize negotiations as masculine in nature (Bowles & Kray, 2013). Women
may attempt to engage in stereotypically masculine behaviors (e.g., assertive or
demanding offers) during a negotiation, but this often results in sanctions from the
counterpart in the form of negative perceptions of the assertive woman negotiator.
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Bowles and colleagues (2007) had participants read a transcript of a conversation
between an employer and a man or woman job candidate about a job offer. The
job candidate either did not negotiate, used moderate language to negotiate (i.e.,
“I would like to get paid at the top of that range”) or used strong language to
negotiate (i.e., “I think I should be paid at the top of that range. This is really
important to me; I think I deserve it.”). The male candidate was evaluated
similarly by participants across all conditions. For the female candidate who
negotiated using moderate or strong language, participants reported feeling
significantly less interested in working with her, and perceived her as being more
demanding and less likable. This study illustrates the Catch-22 for women
negotiators, who often feel they must choose between economic gains or positive
social perceptions. Additionally, women are more likely than men to be targets of
deception in negotiation, thus leading them to make deals under false pretenses
that result in worse outcomes (Kray, Kennedy, & Van Zant, 2014). Another recent
study found that men insisted on receiving higher salaries from a woman hiring
manager compared to a man hiring manager as a result of men experiencing
higher implicit threat (Netchaeva, Kouchaki, & Sheppard, 2015). Lastly, a study
by Kray and Haselhuhn (2012) found that men experiencing threat to their
masculinity were more likely to use unethical bargaining tactics; this effect was
not present for women.
In line with these findings, women are more likely to report a greater
dislike of negotiating (Kray & Babcock, 2006), report lower negotiation selfefficacy (Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993), and are more likely to anticipate what
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is known as backlash, or negative evaluations of their likability, if they engage in
agentic behaviors that would improve perceptions of their negotiation competence
(Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004). A recent study by Williams and
Tiedans (2015) reinforced the backlash concept, finding that women’s likability
(d = -.28) and hireability (d = -.58) is harmed by overt displays of dominance
(e.g., in the form of direct demands), both of which have direct implications for
negotiation. In addition to these effects of backlash, Rudman, Moss-Racusin,
Glick, and Phelan (2012) describe how women’s fear of backlash can inhibit selfregulatory processes in their backlash avoidance model, which incorporates RFT.
Integrating RFT into gender and negotiation research
According to the backlash avoidance model (i.e., BAM), when women
fear backlash for violating gender stereotypes, they are more likely to enter a
cautious, evaluative, and preventative self-regulatory mode to avoid backlash that
subsequently detracts from the ability to engage in unconstrained goal pursuit
(Rudman et al., 2012; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Thus, fear of backlash primes a
prevention focus, and women’s ability to engage in effective self-promotion (i.e.,
“pointing with pride to one’s accomplishments, speaking directly about one’s
strengths and talents, and making internal rather than external attributions for
achievements”) behaviors declines, even in situations that require it (i.e.,
negotiation) for success (Rudman, 1998, p. 629). In a structural equation model
of their theory, Rudman and colleagues (2012) found that fear of backlash
negatively predicted acute promotion focus and positively predicted acute
prevention focus. Following this, regulatory focus predicted success in self-
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promotion; the direct path from fear of backlash to self-promotion was significant,
thus indicating partial mediation by regulatory focus. Indeed, women’s fear of
backlash mediated gender differences in a salary negotiation study by
Amanatullah and Morris (2010). According to BAM, fear of backlash for
successful performance can hurt women negotiators’ outcomes rather than actual
differences in women’s and men’s negotiation abilities.
Based on the recent additions to the negotiation literature concerning RFT
and gender differences in framing and perceptions of fit in distributive buyerseller negotiations (Appelt & Higgins, 2010) and the extant research on gender
differences in negotiation, an integration of BAM and RFT could inform an
intervention designed to improve women’s negotiation success in arenas where
they are still traditionally disadvantaged. Specifically, an intervention could be
designed to minimize women’s fear of backlash in a context where gender
differences exist: salary negotiations. By incorporating research on regulatory fit,
the BAM may be adapted such that women negotiators who experience fit
between their role in a salary negotiation as a candidate (i.e., promotion focus)
and goal pursuit strategy (i.e., eagerness) may report less fear of backlash
compared to women who experience a misfit between their role as a job candidate
and goal pursuit strategy (i.e., vigilance) or women in a control group; this runs
contrary to the BAM’s model where fear of backlash instigates an acute
promotion or prevention focus. Due to the research on fit and promotion focus
generally, women may overcome fear of backlash in a salary negotiation and
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engage in more assertive negotiation tactics when they experience role-strategy fit
in anticipation of the actual negotiation.
Role-strategy fit may serve as a mechanism through which women can
feel justified in adopting goal pursuit strategies in negotiation. Therefore, women
who experience role-strategy fit as a result of being primed to enact eagerness
strategies are predicted to be more objectively (i.e., economically) and
subjectively (i.e., feeling satisfied, reduced fear of backlash) successful compared
to women in a control group. “Eager” negotiators are those who focus on attaining
their aspiration values in a negotiation. Priming an eager negotiator in a salary
negotiation would look like an overt focus on reaching one’s aspiration salary.
Therefore, women primed to be eager job candidates in a salary negotiation may
achieve better economic outcomes compared to women in a control group.
Similarly, women who are primed to be eager job candidates may make
higher first offers compared to women in a control group. Other research has
demonstrated that negotiators who make higher first offers in distributive settings
(i.e., salary negotiations) often claim more value compared to negotiators who
make lower first offers (Buelens & Van Poucke, 2004). One explanation for this
“first offer effect” is that a counterpart becomes cognitively anchored to the salary
negotiations. If women employ an eagerness strategy where they focus on setting
and attaining a higher aspiration value, this may have downstream effects by
minimizing the perception of risk for negotiating for a competitive salary. Women
with an eagerness strategy may be more likely to initiate first offers, increase the
value of first offers, resist counteroffers, and attain a higher negotiated salary
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compared to using no particular strategy. Overall, negotiators with an eagerness
strategy are predicted to make higher first offers compared to those in a control
group as they are likely cognitively “anchored” to their aspiration salary rather
than an arbitrary salary value (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001).
In addition to the influence on economic outcomes of the negotiation, it is
also expected that women using an eagerness strategy will report lower
expectations of backlash compared to women in a control group. Theoretically,
priming women to enact eagerness strategies may induce a general promotion
focus. Previous research has established a relationship between a promotion focus
and positive temperaments and emotional states, and prevention focus and neutral
or slightly more negative emotional states (e.g., anxiousness) (c.f., Higgins et al.,
2001). Focusing on implementing an eagerness strategy could manifest as positive
feelings about an upcoming salary negotiation, thus reducing fear of backlash and
anxiety related to negotiating. As a result, women using an eagerness strategy
may report lower expectations for social backlash compared to women in a
control group. In addition, it is expected that anticipated backlash could mediate
the relationship between gender and negotiated outcomes, thus replicating
predictions from the BAM.
Lastly, women who use an eagerness strategy are expected to report
greater feelings of satisfaction with the negotiation and final negotiated salary.
Similar to the logic described regarding anticipated backlash, the eagerness
strategy prime may enhance positive feelings in addition to serving as a means
through which desired goals are more likely to be attained in the negotiation. As
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seen in previous research, individuals who attain their goals in negotiation report
feeling more satisfied (Curhan et al., 2006). If negotiators who use an eagerness
strategy attain higher negotiated salaries on average compared to negotiators who
do not use any particular strategy, it is likely they also report greater feelings of
satisfaction. As a result, it is expected that women who use an eagerness strategy
will report greater subjective feelings of satisfaction with the negotiation
compared to women who don’t use any particular strategy.
To elicit the strongest effects of these predictions, the current research will
utilize trained male confederates to play the role of a hiring manager in a salary
negotiation. This approach is similar to previous research that used experimental
manipulations aimed at reducing gender differences in negotiation (Stevens et al.,
1993; Tellhed & Björklund, 2011). Since the gender of one’s negotiation
counterpart influences behavior, controlling for this effect as much as possible
will present a clearer picture of the influence of an eagerness strategy on gender
differences in a salary negotiation.
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Hypotheses
Regulatory focus was predicted to relate to negotiation strategies,
perceptions, and outcomes, and produce distinct gender differences when
manipulated. The following hypotheses describe these predictions in greater
detail.
Hypothesis 1A. The eagerness strategy will lead to negotiating significantly
higher final salaries compared to no specific strategy.
Hypothesis 1B. The eagerness strategy will lead to significantly higher first offers
compared to no specific strategy.
Hypothesis 1C. The eagerness strategy will lead to significantly higher average
feelings of negotiation satisfaction compared to no specific strategy.
Hypothesis 2. Women will report significantly higher chronic prevention focus
compared to men.
Hypothesis 3A. There will be an interaction between gender and strategy on
negotiated outcome such that women who use an eagerness strategy will negotiate
significantly higher final salaries compared to women who use no specific
strategy.
Hypothesis 3B. There will be an interaction between gender and strategy on first
offers such that women who use an eagerness strategy will negotiate significantly
higher first offers compared to women who use no specific strategy.
Hypothesis 3C. There will be an interaction between gender and strategy on
subjective outcomes such that women who use an eagerness strategy will report
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significantly higher negotiation satisfaction compared to women who use no
specific strategy.
Hypothesis 4A. Women will report significantly higher anticipated negotiation
backlash compared to men.
Hypothesis 4B. Women who use an eagerness strategy will report significantly
lower anticipated negotiation backlash compared to women who use no specific
strategy.
Hypothesis 5. Anticipated negotiation backlash will mediate the relationship
between gender and final negotiated salary.
Method
This research utilized a 2 (eagerness strategy, free choice strategy) X 2
(male, female) between-subjects factorial design to examine male and female
participants in a salary negotiation regarding their expectations of backlash, their
negotiated outcomes (i.e., first offer and final negotiated salary), and negotiation
satisfaction (i.e., terms of the negotiation, overall feelings of satisfaction and
competence following the negotiation, feelings about the negotiation process, and
feelings about the negotiation counterpart).
The following sections describe the proposed participant sample, scales
and measures for use including the negotiation simulation and intervention
materials, and the procedures of the research protocol.
Research Participants
The current research required a sample size of 130 participants total per
the power analysis tool G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). In
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G*Power, the following a priori assumptions were used to determine sample size
given: confidence level (i.e., 95%), power (i.e., .90), predicted effect size (i.e.,
d=.20), and proposed analyses which include ANCOVAs of at most a 2 X 2
design, and mediation. The confidence interval was set at 95% in line with
standards for null hypothesis significance testing (Coolican, 2014). The predicted
effect size was estimated using a combination of Cohen’s (1992) standards for
small effect sizes (i.e., d=.10) and the existing research which has reported similar
analyses where the effect size of gender on economic negotiation outcomes (i.e.,
in distributive settings such as salary negotiations) is typically between d=.1 and
d=.3 (Mazei et al., 2015). The relationship between regulatory focus and
economic negotiation outcomes has previously been estimated at d=.3 (Lanaj,
Chang, & Johnson, 2013).
Participants were drawn from two sources. The first source of participants
was through DePaul’s research participant pool and the second source was from
campus recruiting of non-research pool participants.
Procedure
Participants were recruited through the research participant pool or
campus recruitment efforts were directed to a lab on the Lincoln Park Campus.
Participants were asked to read and sign an informed consent document which
outlined the requirements for their participation (i.e., 18 years of age or older,
ability to speak, read, and write English fluently) and notified that they could end
their participation at any time (Appendix A). Research participant pool
participants were given 1.5 credits for their participation and non-research pool
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participants received a $10 Amazon gift card at the conclusion of the experiment.
There were two separate consent forms.
To elicit the strongest control for the hypotheses, the research utilized
trained male confederates to play the role of a hiring manager in a salary
negotiation. This approach is similar to previous research that has used trained
confederates in a paradigm which tests an intervention aimed at reducing gender
differences in negotiation (Stevens et al., 1993; Tellhed & Björklund, 2011).
Because the gender of one’s negotiation counterpart can influence behavior (c.f.,
Amanatullah & Morris, 2010), controlling for this effect will present a clearer
picture of the influence of the regulatory focus manipulation on gender
differences in a salary negotiation.
Participants were informed that they would negotiate with another
participant and were not informed that a confederate played the role of the hiring
manager until the conclusion of the study. Three confederates (i.e., two male
undergraduate students and one male graduate student) were trained on the
experimental protocol as well as a script that was loosely derived from similar
negotiation research that used confederates. The confederates were trained on a
script that detailed the offers and counteroffers they were to employ throughout
the negotiation depending on the participant’s (i.e., job candidate’s) behavior,
including a payoff table (see Appendix B). Confederates were given explicit
instructions about the amount of the first offer and the amount to concede
following counteroffers made by the participant. Confederates were to concede
different amounts to the participants depending on the legitimacy of the
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participant’s justifications. Legitimate justifications were directly related to the
negotiation instructions that participants were provided (e.g., cost of living, offer
from another company) or were otherwise directly job-related (e.g., previous
experience related to the job such as an internship, research on the competitive
salaries offered by others in the field). Justifications that were not considered
legitimate were not directly job-related (e.g., paying off debt).
Confederates were instructed to respond using pre-determined phrases
(e.g., “I can’t accept that salary. Offers are made based on the market value and
what competitors are offering”) if the participant reiterated a previously used
justification, justified their offer or counteroffer using a mix of legitimate and
illegitimate justifications, or used an irrelevant justification (i.e., non-job related).
Additionally, the confederate was informed to resist the participant on at least two
other occasions if the participant continued producing legitimate justifications
with subsequent counteroffers beyond the first few exchanges.
Confederates received at least two hours of training prior to interacting
with participants. All confederates were instructed to alert the experimenter in the
event they knew a participant.
After signing the informed consent form, an experimenter instructed the
participants to complete the pre-negotiation questionnaire. Participants responded
to two scales, which measured their chronic regulatory focus and negotiation selfefficacy.
Pre-negotiation questionnaire. The pre-negotiation materials included
the following (in order): The Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (see Appendix C)
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and the Negotiation Self-Efficacy (i.e., DSE and ISE) scales (see Appendix D).
Next, participants were instructed to read information about the upcoming
negotiation, which included the experimental manipulation of regulatory focus.
Negotiation instructions and manipulation. Participants were assigned
to the role of a job candidate and received written information which described
that they were entering a final salary negotiation for a new job. This paradigm
was adapted from “The Bonus” (c.f., Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). The
negotiation instructions described the job candidate’s background and interests to
serve as reasonable justifications during the negotiation (e.g., previous job
experience), as well as an alternative to reaching a negotiated agreement (i.e.,
another job offer with a salary of $55,000) as well as a salary that served as a high
target ($70,000). All participants received the same background information about
the negotiation.
Regulatory focus, the major study variable, was manipulated such that
male and female participants were randomly assigned to either the manipulation
condition (i.e., instructed to adopt an eagerness strategy for the salary negotiation)
or a control condition (i.e., instructed to adopt any strategy for the salary
negotiation) (see Appendix E). The eagerness strategy includes a focus on one’s
aspiration value (i.e., the maximum salary one wishes to attain from the salary
negotiation) and framing the salary negotiation as an opportunity to maximize
one’s own outcomes. Conversely, the participants in the control condition could
adopt any strategy, which includes an emphasis on the importance of setting a
strategy (i.e., specific offers or behaviors that could be effective depending on the
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expected behavior of one’s counterpart) in salary negotiations. Participants were
given ten minutes to prepare and write down their negotiation strategy.
Prior to negotiating, participants completed four items which measure the
extent to which they viewed the upcoming negotiation as an opportunity to avoid
losses or achieve gains, and anticipated backlash items, which asks the participant
to identify the offer (e.g., $65,000) which would induce negative reactions from
the hiring manager (see Appendix F).
Next, the confederate (i.e., hiring manager) was moved to the same room
as the participant (i.e., job candidate). The experimenter then instructed the
participant and the confederate to begin the negotiation. Participants had up to
fifteen minutes to negotiate with the confederate acting as the hiring manager.
First offers were recorded by research assistants. If the confederate (i.e., hiring
manager) made the first offer, this was noted and the participant’s (i.e., job
candidate’s) counteroffer (i.e., first offer in the negotiation) was recorded.
Post-negotiation questionnaire. The post-negotiation questionnaire
included the final agreed-upon salary value, the Subjective Value Inventory
(Appendix G), experienced backlash items (Appendix H), and demographic items
(Appendix I). Given that the experiment required deception, participants were
fully debriefed and asked to sign a form to receive credit (Research Participant
Pool) or receive a $10 gift card (non-Research Participant Pool) (Appendix J).
Measures
Regulatory focus. The Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (i.e., RFQ) was
developed to measure an individual’s chronic regulatory focus (Higgins et al.,
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2001). The RFQ taps into the prior success that an individual has had in terms of
prevention or promotion; people who have successfully used eagerness strategies
(i.e., indicative of promotion focus) in the past will likely use eagerness strategies
in new situations while people who have successfully used vigilance strategies
(i.e., indicative of prevention focus) in the past will likely use vigilance strategies
in new situations. The RFQ has 11 items on a 5-point Likert-type scale.
Individuals who have had previous success with eagerness strategies will have a
higher promotion score and individuals with previous success with vigilance
strategies will have a higher prevention score. An individual can score high on
both, on one, or on neither scale. Previous research (Grant & Higgins, 2003;
Higgins et al., 2001) has reported Cronbach’s alphas of .73 for promotion focus
items and .80 for prevention focus items and test-retest reliability of .79 and .81,
respectively. Both sub-scales were also significantly related to achievement
motivation (Grant & Higgins, 2003; Higgins et al., 2001).
Negotiation self-efficacy. The Distributive and Integrative Self-Efficacy
(i.e., DSE and ISE) scales measure a negotiator’s confidence in their ability to
utilize strategies that are specific to distributive or integrative negotiations
(Sullivan, O’Connor, & Burris, 2006). Task specific (rather than general)
measures of self-efficacy are more predictive of behavior because they target the
beliefs associated with engaging in particular behaviors for a given activity
(Bandura, 1997). The DSE and ISE each evaluate four tactics that are enacted in
either distributive or integrative negotiations (e.g., gaining the upper hand or
exchanging concessions), and ask participants to rate their confidence in using
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each tactic successfully in a negotiation on a 100-point scale where 0=no
confidence and 100=full confidence across each of the tactics. Previous research
reported internal consistency (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha) between .80 and .90 across
the two scales, divergent validity (i.e., low correlation coefficients) with a general
measure of self-efficacy, and evidence of predictive validity such that the DSE
significantly predicted the use of distributive tactics in negotiation and the ISE
significantly predicted the use of integrative tactics in negotiation (Sullivan et al.,
2006).
Manipulation check. Four manipulation check items followed the
administration of the negotiation information. Using a 7 point Likert-type scale
ranging from 1= “Strongly Disagree” to 7= “Strongly Agree”, participants rated
the extent to which they viewed the negotiation as a chance to create value,
minimize losses, attain resources, and maintain resources. The “create value” and
“attain resources” items were expected to be rated higher for participants primed
for an eagerness strategy compared to participants in the control condition. These
items were used in previous research (c.f., Appelt & Higgins, 2010) where the
“minimize losses” and “maintain resources” items were reverse-scored and
combined with the other two items to create an average “gain framing” score;
however, their study reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .66. For the current research,
the two eagerness items and two vigilance items were combined separately from
one another.
Anticipated backlash. Participants completed two items measuring
anticipated backlash: “How much do you think you can reasonably ask for
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without the hiring manager’s perceiving you to be a pushy person?” and “How
much do you think you can reasonably ask for without causing the hiring manager
to punish you for being too demanding?” (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010).
Participants responded with the dollar value threshold at which they expect to
incur negative social consequences; thus, a lower score indicates greater
anticipation of backlash. Previous research has found these items to be highly
correlated, thus participants’ responses will be averaged to form an overall score
for anticipated backlash (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010).
Negotiation subjective value. The Subjective Value Inventory (i.e., SVI)
includes 16 items measuring four distinct but related sub-scales on perceptions in
negotiation (Curhan et al., 2006). Items are evaluated on 7-point Likert-type
scales. These include four instrumental outcomes items (i.e., feelings about the
terms of the deal such as whether the economic outcome was desirable, balanced,
and consistent), four “self” items (i.e., feelings about the self, such as the extent to
which participants feel they lost face or felt competent in the negotiation, and feel
satisfied they behaved appropriately), four process items (i.e., feelings about the
negotiation process such as whether participants feel they have been heard and
treated fairly), and four relationship items (i.e., feelings about the relationship
participants had with their negotiation counterpart, positive impressions of the
counterpart, and whether they had a solid relationship to work together in the
future). In line with previous research using the SVI, participants’ scores across
the items will be averaged to create a global score of satisfaction with the
negotiation. The four-factor structure of the SVI was established in Curhan et al.
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(2006) and found that the SVI significantly predicts negotiators’ desire to work
together in the future.
Experienced backlash. The Experienced Backlash scale includes 6 items
related to the participant’s willingness to work with their negotiation counterpart
at work or socially (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013). Items are evaluated on a 7point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = “Not at all” to 7 = “Extremely”. A higher
average score across the items indicates greater social acceptance of the
counterpart and therefore less backlash compared to lower average scores.
Amanatullah and Tinsey (2013) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .93 using the
scale within an undergraduate student sample. Previous research has shown that
experienced backlash moderates the relationship between gender and negotiated
outcomes such that women tend to experience greater backlash compared to men
for negotiating assertively. As a result, experienced backlash is negatively
correlated with women’s economic or financial outcomes in negotiation compared
to men’s.
Demographics. Lastly, participants responded to the following
demographic items: gender (0=male, 1=female), race/ethnicity (1=White,
2=African American/Black, 3=Hispanic, 4=Asian, 5=Hawaiian or other Pacific
Islander, 6=American Indian, 7=Two or More Races), age (reported numerically),
and previous negotiation experience (1=“No previous experience”, 2=“Little
experience”, 3=“Some experience”, 4=“Quite a bit of experience”, or
5=“Extensive experience”).
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Results
The hypotheses for this study were evaluated using 2X2 factorial
ANCOVAs, one-way ANOVAs, and mediation analyses using Preacher and
Hayes’ (2004) methodology. Gender (male, female) and experimental condition
(i.e., eagerness strategy, control condition) were the independent variables.
Economic outcome (i.e., salary), first offers, anticipated backlash, and subjective
outcomes (job candidate’s global scores on the SVI) were dependent variables.
Anticipated backlash was also examined as a mediator between gender and final
negotiated salary.
The total sample size analyzed consisted of 130 participants. As a first
step, the data was checked to examine outliers, missing data, descriptive statistics,
and reliability statistics for all study variables. Three cases were excluded due to
participants either knowing the confederate or not completing all study measures.
There were sixty-five men and sixty-five women who participated: 63.8% White
(n=83), 8.5% Black (n=11), 11.5% Hispanic (n=15), 10% Asian (n=13), 0.8%
Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander (n=1), and 5.4% two or more races (n=7), with
a mean age of 20.19 (SD=2.73). Final negotiated salary ranged from $55,000 to
$70,000, first offers ranged from $55,000 to $85,000, and anticipated backlash
ranged from $45,000 to $92,500. A summary of descriptive statistics and
correlations for all major study variables is presented in Table 1. Correlations did
not significantly differ based on which of the three confederate hiring managers
negotiated or based on participant type (research pool versus $10 gift card).
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Reliability analyses on sub-scales of the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire
(i.e., promotion focus and prevention focus), the Negotiation Self-Efficacy items,
the anticipated backlash items, the experienced backlash items, and the Subjective
Value Inventory (SVI) showed Cronbach’s alpha exceeded .80 for each scale;
therefore, all scales were included in relevant hypothesis testing.
Previous negotiation experience was significantly correlated with final
negotiated salary (r= .19, p < .05) and negotiation satisfaction (r= .26, p < .01),
and was therefore entered as a covariate for the appropriate analyses. Previous
negotiation experience was also significantly correlated with age (r=.35, p < .01).
Although no formal hypotheses were tested regarding negotiation selfefficacy, it was significantly correlated with gender (r= -.36, p < .01), age (r=.26,
p < .01), previous negotiation experience (r=.34, p < .01), and anticipated
backlash (r=.35, p < .01).
The manipulation check items revealed that participants in the eagerness
strategy condition did not statistically significantly differ in mean responses to the
two items indicating a “gain frame” compared to the participants in the control
condition F(128)=.03, p=.85 (M=5.63 (SD=1.19) and M=5.66 (SD=.73),
respectively), suggesting that development of an eagerness strategy does not
produce a stronger gain focus in and of itself.
Data was found to meet assumptions for ANCOVA, ANOVA, and
mediation analysis. Specifically, data met assumptions of normality,
independence, and homogeneity of variance. The residuals of each dependent
variable given each condition of the independent variables was examined using
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normal and detrended normal q-q plots, histograms, and box plots. Although the
final negotiated salary variable was bi-modally distributed, the data appeared
normal within each level of the independent variables (e.g., male, female, no
strategy assigned, eagerness strategy).
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations of major study variables
Variable Name

M

SD

1

1. Gender

-

-

-

-

-0.05

-

2.73

-0.04

0.00

-

2. Condition
3. Age

20.19

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4. Ethnicity

-

-

0.04

0.05

0.15

-

5. Experience

2.11

1.07

-0.14

-0.02

0.35**

0.31**

-

57.47

19.32

-0.36**

-0.12

0.26**

-0.08

0.34**

3.16

0.74

0.10

0.06

-0.09

0.03

-0.07

-0.04

8. Gain Frame

5.65

0.99

-0.12

-0.02

0.03

-0.19*

0.27*

0.41**

-0.17

-

9. Loss Frame
10. Anticipated
Backlash

5.19

0.99

0.09

-0.01

-0.02

-0.05

0.16

0.14

-0.04

0.59**

68573.00

7529.89

-0.26**

0.26**

0.04

-0.07

0.05

0.18*

-0.09

0.07

0.05

(.89)

11. First Offer

65723.08

5022.45

-0.12

0.35**

0.06

0.05

-0.01

-0.07

-0.05

-0.12

-0.11

0.36**

-

12. Final Negotiated
Salary

62003.85

3203.98

-0.28**

0.32**

0.08

0.11

0.19*

-0.02

-0.09

0.01

-0.06

0.49**

0.25**

-

4.79

0.92

0.10

0.08

0.14

0.22*

0.26**

0.02

0.08

0.15

0.21*

-0.09

-0.16

0.24**

6. Negotiation SelfEfficacy
7. Prevention Focus

13. SVI Composite

13

(.93)
(.85)
-

(.89)

Note: n = 130, * p < .05, 2-tailed ** p < .01, 2-tailed, Cronbach’s alpha reported on the diagonal where applicable. Gender (0=male, 1=female), Condition (0=no assigned
strategy, 1=eagerness strategy)
Scales: Previous negotiation experience (1-5), Negotiation Self Efficacy (1-100), Prevention Focus (1-5), Gain/Loss Frame (1-7), Anticipated Backlash (U.S. dollars), SVI (1-7)
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Hypothesis 1A predicted that participants with an eagerness strategy
would negotiate significantly higher salaries compared to participants with no
specific strategy. The ANCOVA included experimental condition (i.e., 0= no
assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as the independent variable, previous
negotiation experience as a covariate, and final negotiated salary as the dependent
variable. The analysis revealed a statistically significant main effect which
supports the hypothesis F(1, 128)=14.79, p < .01, d=.67 (see Figure 1).
Participants with an eagerness strategy negotiated a higher average final salary
(M=63,000.00, SD=3,187.33) compared to participants with no specific strategy
(M=60,944.44, SD=2,886.44). Therefore, Hypothesis 1A was supported.
Hypothesis 1B predicted that participants with an eagerness strategy
would make significantly higher first offers compared to participants with no
specific strategy. The one-way ANOVA included experimental condition (i.e., 0=
no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as the independent variable and first
offer (i.e., dollar value) as the dependent variable. The analysis revealed a
statistically significant main effect which supports the hypothesis F(1,
128)=18.15, p < .01, d=.75 (see Figure 2). Participants with an eagerness strategy
condition made higher average first offers (M=67,432.84, SD=4,881.00)
compared to participants with no specific strategy (M=63,904.76, SD=4,539.13).
Therefore, Hypothesis 1B was supported.
Hypothesis 1C predicted that participants with an eagerness strategy
would report significantly higher negotiation satisfaction compared to participants
with no specific strategy. The one-way ANOVA included experimental condition
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(i.e., 0=no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as the independent variable
and SVI composite (i.e., average across all SVI items) as the dependent variable.
The analysis did not reveal a statistically significant main effect F(1, 128)=0.72,
p=.40, d=.15. Participants with an eagerness strategy were only slightly more
satisfied with the negotiation (M=4.87, SD=0.98) compared to participants with
no specific strategy (M=4.73, SD=0.84). Therefore, Hypothesis 1C was not
supported. However, negotiation satisfaction was significantly correlated with
final negotiated salary (r=.24, p < .01) and previous experience (r=.26, p < .01).
Table 2 illustrates the descriptive statistics across experimental condition
for Hypotheses 1A, 1B, and 1C below.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics by experimental condition across dependent
variables
Condition
Final Salary

First Offer

Subjective Value

N

M

SD

Control

63

60944.44

2886.44

Eagerness

67

63000.00

3187.33

Control

63

63904.76

4539.13

Eagerness

67

67432.84

4881.08

Control

63

4.73

0.84

Eagerness

67

4.87

0.98

Hypothesis 2 predicted that women would be significantly more
prevention focused compared to men. Prevention focus items were completed
prior to the negotiation instructions (and experimental manipulation) were
presented to participants. The one-way ANOVA included participant gender (i.e.,
0=male, 1=female) as the independent variable and average score across the
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prevention focus sub-scale items as the dependent variable. The analysis did not
reveal a statistically significant main effect F(1, 128)=1.36, p=.25, d=.20. Women
were slightly more prevention focused (M=3.23, SD=.78) compared to men
(M=3.08, SD=.69). Therefore, Hypothesis 2A was not supported.
Hypothesis 3A predicted that women with an eagerness strategy would
negotiate significantly higher salaries compared to women with no specific
strategy. The two-way, factorial ANCOVA included participant gender (i.e.,
0=male, 1=female) and condition (i.e., 0= no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness
strategy) as the independent variables, previous negotiation experience as a
covariate, and final negotiated salary as the dependent variable. The omnibus test
was statistically significant F(4,125)=7.76, p < .01. The interaction term between
participant gender and condition was not statistically significant F(1,125)=0.16,
p=.69. The sequential, Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparison of women with
an eagerness strategy (M=62,281.25, SD=512.72) to women with no specific
strategy (M=60,000.00, SD=504.89) revealed that there was a statistically
significant mean difference in final negotiated salary F(1, 124)=10.05, p < .01,
d=.76 (see Figure 3). Therefore, Hypothesis 3A was supported.
Hypothesis 3B predicted women with an eagerness strategy would make
significantly higher first offers compared to women with no specific strategy. The
two-way, factorial ANOVA included participant gender (i.e., 0=male, 1=female)
and condition (i.e., 0= no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as the
independent variables and first offer dollar value as the dependent variable. The
omnibus test was statistically significant F(3,126)=6.80, p < .01. The interaction
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term between participant gender and condition was not statistically significant
F(1,126)=0.55, p=.46. The sequential, Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparison
of women with an eagerness strategy (M=66,562.50, SD=820.48) to women with
no assigned strategy (M=63,696.97, SD=807.96) revealed that there was a
statistically significant mean difference in first offers F(1, 125)=6.19, p < .01,
d=.63 (see Figure 4). Therefore, Hypothesis 3B was supported.
Hypothesis 3C predicted that women with an eagerness strategy would be
significantly more satisfied with the negotiation compared to women with no
specific strategy. The two-way, factorial ANOVA included participant gender
(i.e., 0=male, 1=female) and condition (i.e., 0= no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness
strategy) as the independent variables and satisfaction with the negotiation (i.e.,
mean scores on the SVI composite) as the dependent variable. The omnibus test
was not statistically significant F(3,126)=.94, p=.42. Therefore, the interaction
term between participant gender and condition was not statistically significant
F(1,126)=0.69, p=.41. Women with an eagerness strategy (M=4.89, SD=.16) had
about the same reported overall satisfaction with the negotiation as women with
no specific strategy (M=4.89, SD=.16). Therefore, Hypothesis 3C was not
supported.
Table 3 illustrates the descriptive statistics by experimental condition for
women in Hypotheses 3A, 3B, 3C and 4B.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for gender by experimental condition across
dependent variables
Women
Men
Variable
Final
Salary

Condition
Control

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

33

60000.00

2318.40

30

61983.33

3122.45

Eagerness

32

62281.25

3578.47

35

63657.14

2667.26

First Offer

Control

33

63696.97

4304.68

30

64133.33

4847.56

Eagerness

32

66562.50

4838.94

35

68228.57

4851.23

Control

33

4.89

0.91

30

4.56

0.74

Approach

32

4.90

0.99

35

4.84

0.99

Anticipated Control
Backlash
Eagerness

33

64556.67

4512.53

30

68836.67

8641.27

32

68722.50

4698.66

35

71997.00

9183.22

Subjective
Value

Hypothesis 4A predicted that women would indicate greater anticipated
backlash for negotiating (i.e., the average across the two anticipated backlash
items would be lower for women) compared to men. Anticipated backlash was
measured after the negotiation instructions (and experimental manipulation) were
completed, but before participants negotiated with the hiring manager. This
hypothesis was tested using a one-way ANOVA which included participant
gender (i.e., 0=male, 1=female) as the independent variable and anticipated
backlash (i.e., mean across two anticipated backlash items) as the dependent
variable. The main effect of gender on anticipated backlash was statistically
significant F(1,126)=9.15, p < .01, d=.54. Women anticipated greater backlash for
negotiating (i.e., they anticipated greater backlash at a lower threshold value for
the negotiated salary) (M=66,607.54, SD=5,027.97) compared to men
(M=70,538.38, SD=9,008.75). Therefore, Hypothesis 4A was supported.
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Hypothesis 4B predicted that women with an eagerness strategy would
anticipate significantly less backlash for negotiating (i.e., the average across the
two anticipated backlash items would be higher) compared to women with no
specific strategy. Anticipated backlash was measured after the negotiation
instructions (and experimental manipulation) were completed, but before
participants negotiated with the hiring manager. This hypothesis was tested using
a two-way, factorial ANOVA which included participant gender (i.e., 0=male,
1=female) and condition (i.e., 0= no assigned strategy, 1=eagerness strategy) as
the independent variables and anticipated backlash (i.e., mean across two
anticipated backlash items) as the dependent variable. The omnibus test was
statistically significant F(3,126)=6.24, p < .01. The interaction term between
participant gender and condition was not statistically significant F(1,126)=.16,
p=.69. The sequential, Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparison of women with
an eagerness strategy (M=68,722.50, SD=1,237.32) to women with no specific
strategy (M=64,556.67, SD=1,218.42) revealed that there was a statistically
significant mean difference F(1, 125)=5.76, p < .01, d=.90. Therefore, Hypothesis
4B was supported.
Hypothesis 5 predicted that the effect of gender on final negotiated salary
would be explained (i.e., mediated) by anticipated backlash. Anticipated backlash
was measured after the negotiation instructions (and experimental manipulation)
were completed, but before participants negotiated with the hiring manager.
Hypothesis 3C was tested using the Preacher and Hayes (2004) method for simple
mediation where gender (0=male, 1=female) was entered as the independent
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variable, anticipated backlash was the mediator, and final negotiated salary was
the dependent variable. Anticipated backlash was found to fully mediate the
relationship between participant gender and final negotiated salary. The indirect
effect was -.752.95 with a bootstrapped 95% confidence interval between 1274.93 and -305.90 (Bootstrap SE=245.09); since the confidence interval does
not include zero, this is considered a statistically significant effect. Therefore,
Hypothesis 5 was supported.
Discussion
The current research examined the effect of an experimental manipulation
of regulatory focus on gender differences in a salary negotiation; namely, the
amount of a job candidate’s first offer, the final negotiated salary, overall
satisfaction with the negotiation, and anticipated social backlash for negotiating.
The results of this study are promising in that they generally indicate that anyone
may be able to improve their salary negotiation outcomes if they consciously
adopt an eagerness strategy where they focus on their aspiration value and
mindfully frame the negotiation as an opportunity rather than an obligation.
Women in particular can benefit from adopting an eagerness strategy to attain a
higher starting salary and reduce feelings of anticipated backlash for negotiating
to achieve their aspiration value in negotiations. Previous research has already
demonstrated that sellers who employ an eagerness strategy compared to a
vigilance strategy (i.e., a focus on avoiding losses) fare better in buyer-seller
negotiations (Galinsky et al., 2005; Appelt & Higgins, 2010). The current
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research replicated this effect, and extended RFT by integrating the influence of
gender effects.
Regulatory focus theory predicts that individuals who enact strategies (i.e.,
an eagerness strategy) that aligns with the general orientation of the role they
occupy (i.e., a job candidate looking to maximize their starting salary) will exhibit
increased feelings of fit (Appelt & Higgins, 2010). The exact mechanism through
which the influence of regulatory fit increases negotiated outcomes is theorized to
be due to one’s enhanced ability to focus on aspiration value, which provides an
anchoring effect and increases resistance to making concessions (Galinsky et al.,
2001). In the current study, participants in the eagerness strategy condition did not
experience significantly greater fit with their role (i.e., higher average “gain
frame” scores) compared to participants in the control condition. The enactment
of any strategy likely enhances feelings of fit with one’s negotiator role as it
focuses attention on behaviors that are expected to result in positive outcomes.
The current study did not replicate a previously found gender difference in
chronic prevention focus, although women were slightly more prevention focused
compared to men (Appelt et al., 2009). Chronic prevention focus was also unrelated to anticipated backlash, first offers, final negotiated salary, and negotiation
satisfaction. Salary negotiations represent “strong” situations whereby norms for
behavior wash out individual differences such as chronic prevention focus. The
development of an eagerness strategy may further reinforce certain negotiation
behavior. Therefore, whether someone is chronically prevention or promotion
focused is not as relevant as is the type of strategy (eagerness or vigilance) and
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associated behaviors that are the strongest determinant of success in salary
negotiations.
There was no statistically significant interaction between gender and
experimental condition on final negotiated salary, first offer, or negotiation
satisfaction. However, men still statistically significantly outperformed women in
the negotiation. Men outperformed women by an average of $1,375.89 in the
eagerness condition. Men outperformed women by an average of $1,983.33 in the
control condition. This may be driven in part by the fact that men made
significantly higher first offers compared to women (see Table 3). Previous
research has demonstrated that first offer values explain a significant amount of
variance in final negotiated outcomes such as salary (Galinsky & Mussweiler,
2001). Therefore, the effect of the gender difference in first offer value likely
exacerbated gender differences in final negotiated salary. Additionally, this
finding confirms existing research on gender differences in negotiation, which
shows there is a small but persistent performance effect in favor of men in
negotiation (Mazei et al., 2015). In particular, men tend to outperform women in
single-issue negotiations (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). From a role congruity
perspective, behavioral norms in salary negotiations (e.g., making assertive offers
or counter-offers, resisting concessions) elicit a strong association with
masculinity (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Therefore, men who enact these behaviors in
a salary negotiation are perceived as adhering to those norms. As a result, they
encounter less resistance and feel emboldened to ask for more compared to
women. In addition, the use of a male confederate in the role of the hiring
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manager may have further strengthened the stereotypes associated with salary
negotiations as a traditionally masculine domain.
Although it would be ideal to “level the playing field” completely, the fact
that the eagerness strategy produced a significant main effect on final negotiated
salary was a positive outcome of this research. Strong contextual cues for
acceptable negotiation behaviors were likely instigated through the instructions to
focus on an aspiration value in the eagerness strategy. In addition, the bargaining
range ($55,000 to over $70,000) was obvious and participants had a clear
alternative to a negotiated agreement (i.e., job offer from another company). The
clarity of the boundary conditions for this negotiation and power generated by the
job candidate’s alternative likely enhanced participants’ expectations that
negotiating assertively would lead to a high starting salary.
Women significantly improved their negotiation outcomes in the
eagerness strategy condition compared to the control condition (i.e., no strategy
assigned). On average, women in the eagerness strategy condition negotiated final
salaries that were $2,281.25 higher compared to women in the control condition.
Although men in the eagerness strategy condition also improved relative to men
in the control condition, it was by a smaller margin ($1,673.81) compared to the
difference between women in each experimental condition.
In alignment with the Backlash Avoidance Model (BAM), women who
experienced a reduction in anticipated backlash negotiated higher starting salaries.
The BAM suggests that the positive effect of reducing anticipated backlash stems
from its impact on self-regulation such that attention which would typically be
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devoted towards setting and attaining goals in a negotiation is inhibited by a
preoccupation with avoiding negative social outcomes for enacting behaviors that
violate gender stereotypes, such as women assertively and confidently negotiating
for a high starting salary (Rudman et al., 2012). In the current research, it is likely
that the clarity of expectations in terms of the focus on attaining the aspiration
value in the eagerness condition served as a cognitive anchor, which replicates
previous research (Galinsky et al., 2001). In addition, these situational factors
likely reduced women’s feelings of ambiguity regarding norms for behavior.
Previous research has found that gender effects in negotiation tend to wash out in
contexts which clearly delineate boundary conditions such as the bargaining range
and generate power through the strength of alternatives to a negotiated agreement
(i.e., BATNA) (Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Mazei et al., 2015). In
tandem, these factors likely contributed to women’s relative success in the
eagerness condition compared to the control condition.
The effect of the eagerness strategy to improve women’s negotiation
outcomes may also be explained through role congruity theory. For female
negotiators, gender-role incongruence in the form of occupying a role within a
distributive negotiation setting, such as a salary negotiation, can elicit social
backlash, inhibit women’s negotiating behavior, and diminish women’s
negotiation performance (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bear & Babcock, 2012;
Bowles & Babcock, 2013; Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007). In the present
research, women did anticipate greater backlash compared to men, regardless of
experimental condition (see Table 3). An eagerness strategy may implicitly cue
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women to think about justifications that enhance the legitimacy of producing a
higher first offer in the negotiation, such as providing concrete, objective
examples of their accomplishments. In the present research, women did, in fact,
report lower anticipated backlash and produced higher initial first offers in the
eagerness condition by an average of $2,865.53 compared to women in the
control condition. This likely provided an anchor against which the confederate
acting as the hiring manager would base subsequent counter-offers.
Negotiation satisfaction was not statistically significantly influenced by
the use of an eagerness strategy or gender, although men and participants in the
control condition were slightly less satisfied with their negotiated outcomes
compared to women and participants in the eagerness condition (see Table 3).
Negotiation satisfaction was significantly, positively correlated with previous
negotiation experience and final negotiated salary. This is dissimilar from some
previous research which has suggested a “winner’s curse” where negotiators who
achieve the best outcomes feel less satisfied with their negotiation outcomes
(Curan et al., 2006). Given the experimental context of this study and the
simplicity of the negotiation paradigm, it may more difficult to induce
participants’ feelings of psychological realism and emotional commitment to the
outcomes of the negotiation. Alternatively, it may be the case that enacting an
eagerness strategy is motivating but stressful. People may use more mental
resources and feel more stressed when adopting the eagerness strategy as it is not
aligned with their typical approach, even though they objectively perform better
by achieving a higher starting salary. These feelings of stress or depletion of

56

mental resources could result in similar feelings of satisfaction when compared to
participants in control condition.
Ultimately, there should be no gender difference between women’s and
men’s starting salaries (when there is commensurate previous job experience and
other job-related factors), but the current research at least provides a starting point
for the implementation of a motivation-focused intervention where everyone,
especially women, can improve their salary negotiation performance by adopting
an eagerness strategy.
Strengths and Limitations
Salary negotiations represent a dynamic context, where interorganizational norms and expectations can vary greatly. Often, salary negotiations
can occur through various mediums of communication over a period of time (e.g.,
over the phone, email, in person) depending on the uniqueness and significance of
the role to an organization (e.g., entry-level versus senior leader). The current
research was conducted using an experimental laboratory context that captured
cross-sectional and self-reported data from a population of undergraduate students
which limits generalizability. However, the current research is benefitted by a
largely naïve population of negotiators. Testing an intervention that could be used
within this population is critical to preventing small gender differences in starting
salary from cumulating over time. Indeed, gender differences in negotiation
performance diminish as women gain experience in negotiation settings, when the
bargaining range is clear, and the opportunity to negotiate is presented overtly
(Mazei et al., 2015).
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Similarly, using a trained confederate limits the conclusions that can be
drawn in terms of how individuals in the experimental condition may have reacted
depending on the behavior of their counterpart. Although there was a script which
dictated rules for the confederate’s reaction to a participant’s potential offers and
justifications, a certain degree of improvisation was required to create a sense of
realism. For example, confederates were instructed to resist the job candidate’s
offer at least twice throughout the negotiation; the content of this resistance was
not specifically scripted. In a paradigm involving two participants, impasses
would have likely occurred more frequently (there were no impasses in the
current study), or the participant in the job candidate role may have walked away
given their BATNA (another job offer). However, given the largest gender effects
typically exist in mixed-gender negotiations, finding support for several
hypotheses in this context (female job candidates paired with a male hiring
manager) may help women determine the best opportunity to consciously focus
on implementing an eagerness strategy.
An alternative explanation for the overall improvements to negotiation
outcomes based on the enactment of an eagerness strategy may be derived from
construal level theory. Instructing participants to outline their negotiating strategy
explicitly (e.g., specific offers and justifications, planned reactions and
counteroffers based on counterpart’s behavior) may instigate a higher construal
level, i.e., a focus on interests or why negotiators want something compared to a
low construal level focus on positions, i.e., what negotiators want. Activation of a
high construal level has been previously shown to positively relate to integrative
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bargaining outcomes (Wening, Keith, & Abele, 2016). It may also be the case
within a salary negotiation that an eagerness strategy activates a high construal
level for the negotiator, and forces them to think from the perspective of a hiring
manager about providing justifications that demonstrate why they deserve a
certain salary.
Lastly, the definition of the current experimental manipulation as an
inducement of a participant’s promotion focus or orientation to achieve gains may
conceptually overlap with goal-setting theory such that the explicit instructions in
the eagerness strategy condition could alternatively be interpreted as instructions
to set a specific goal (i.e., aspiration salary value) and set a strategy to achieve
that goal, which specifies the means through which one will achieve an
instrumental negotiation outcome such as starting salary. Although this is
possible, the overarching conclusions of this research remain the same and should
focus on the positive benefits of enacting the eagerness strategy in salary
negotiations.
Implications and Future Directions
The current research supports the value of a regulatory focus intervention
that could be easily implemented within organizations who utilize salary
negotiations in order to aid in improving the likelihood that male and female job
candidates will be able to achieve starting salaries that are more equitable.
Women, especially those with little previous negotiation experience, can improve
their negotiation outcomes by consciously employing strategies to focus their
attention on their aspiration value in salary negotiations. Importantly, this was
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shown to result in higher first offers, better negotiated outcomes, and reduced
feelings of anticipated social backlash for negotiating compared to using no
particular strategy.
This study also provides additional evidence to support the existing literature
on gender differences in negotiation, and provided a novel theoretical application
of regulatory focus theory in the form of an intervention, adding to the existing
evidence-based recommendations to improve women’s negotiation outcomes.
Future experimental research should replicate and extend the use of the
eagerness strategy with participants rather than confederates in the hiring manager
role. It may be the case that there are interesting interactions between a job
candidate and hiring manager’s gender such that women may be more successful
when paired with a woman hiring manager compared to a man due to further
reductions in anticipated backlash for negotiating assertively as has been
suggested by previous research (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013). Additionally, it
would be important to determine whether the eagerness strategy intervention
influences experienced backlash. For example, women who use an eagerness
strategy may anticipate less backlash and negotiate higher salaries at the expense
of experienced backlash in the form of a hiring manager’s perceptions of her
likability. Downstream effects of decreased likability may influence women’s
advancement in the workplace or at least hinder their initial reputation when they
are starting out in a new job as has been demonstrated by previous research
(Williams & Tiedans, 2015).
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Given that many organizations require job candidates to report their previous
salary, it is likely that the eagerness strategy intervention is less impactful when a
hiring manager possesses this knowledge. Therefore, replications of this research
within professional samples should factor this into research design. Additionally,
organizational samples would likely increase the importance of age and previous
negotiation experience on negotiation outcomes, and should therefore be taken
into consideration.
The present research focused exclusively on main effects and interactions of
the eagerness intervention and gender on negotiation outcomes. Future research
could benefit from integrating the use of negotiation process variables such as
number of concessions, and the use and content of justifications to better
understand the influence of using an eagerness strategy to improve negotiation
outcomes. Perhaps the use of an eagerness strategy increases resistance to
concessions and improves the quality of justifications through the planning
process that is employed.
Lastly, it will be important for future research to examine how the use of
multiple interventions could equalize women’s negotiation outcomes. For
example, women who use an eagerness strategy as well as emphasize an advocacy
role (c.f., Amanatullah & Morris, 2010) could achieve better negotiation
outcomes compared to using either tactic alone.
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Appendix A. Informed Consent Form – Psychology Research Pool and NonResearch Pool
ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH – Research Pool
Starting a New Job Study
Principal Investigator: Mary Keegin, M.A., Graduate Student
Institution: DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, USA
Department (School, College): Psychology, College of Science and Health
Faculty Advisor: Alice Stuhlmacher, Ph.D., Psychology, College of Science and Health
What is the purpose of this research?
We are asking you to be in a research study because we are trying to learn more about how people
interact when discussing terms of employment such as salary. This study is being conducted by
Mary Keegin, M.A., a graduate student at DePaul University as a requirement to obtain her
Doctoral degree. This research is being supervised by her faculty advisor, Alice Stuhlmacher,
Ph.D. There may be other people on the research team assisting with the study.
We hope to include about 130 people in the research.
Why are you being asked to be in the research?
You are invited to participate in this study because you can speak, read, and write fluently in English.
You must be age 18 or older to be in this study. This study is not approved for the enrollment of
people under the age of 18.
What is involved in being in the research study?
If you agree to be in this study, being in the research involves engaging in a salary negotiation as a
specific type of interaction. We are interested in people’s behavior and how they perceive
themselves and others in these situations.
This is the procedure for the study.
• First, you will complete a questionnaire on a computer that contains items asking about
your life experiences and how confident you are using different tactics in negotiations.
• Next, you will read detailed instructions and information concerning a salary negotiation
and your priorities taking on the role of a job candidate. You will be asked to plan your
strategy and write it down for review by the research team.
• After this, you will complete a questionnaire on a computer about your planned goals and
expectations of your counterpart.
• Then you will negotiate with your counterpart in person, who is another student taking on
the role of a hiring manager.
• Finally, you will receive another questionnaire on a computer that will ask your about
your experiences from the negotiation in terms of how satisfied you felt with your
outcomes, how the negotiation process went, how your counterpart behaved, how
confident you feel following the negotiation, your perceptions of your counterpart, and
demographic items (gender, ethnicity, age, and previous negotiation experience).
Importantly, all data in this study will be kept confidential. Your name will not be stored in a way
that can be linked to the data. Furthermore, all data will only be used for research purposes. You
have been randomly assigned (with a random number generator) to one of two groups. In order to
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not influence you before or during the negotiation, we will tell you more about the different
conditions at the end of the experiment.
How much time will this take?
This study will take about 60 minutes of your time in total.
•
•
•

The first part of the study, which includes the questionnaires, reading the negotiation
instructions, and planning your strategy, will take approximately 30 minutes.
You will have time to negotiate with your counterpart for up to 15 minutes.
The final set of questionnaire items will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.

Are there any risks involved in participating in this study?
Being in this study does not involve any risks other than what you would encounter in daily life.
As in your daily interactions, you may feel unsure about the best course of action in negotiating or
uncomfortable about answering certain questions. You do not have to answer any question you do
not want to.
Are there any benefits to participating in this study?
You will not personally benefit from participating in this study.
We hope that what we learn will help other researchers, negotiators, employees, and policy makers
in improving equity in salary negotiations.
Is there any kind of payment, reimbursement or credit for being in this study?
You will be given 1.5 psychology subject pool credits for participation in the research. At the end
of the survey you will be asked to write down your subject pool number. You must provide your
subject pool number in order to be given credit.
Are there any costs to me for being in the research?
You are responsible for any costs related to getting to and from the location where you will
participate in the research.
Can you decide not to participate?
Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate. There will be no
negative consequences, penalties, or loss of benefits if you decide not to participate or change your
mind later and withdraw from the research after you begin participating. Your decision whether or
not to be in the research will not affect your standing with DePaul University.
Who will see my study information and how will the confidentiality of the information collected
for the research be protected?
The research records will be kept and stored securely. Your information will be combined with
information from other people taking part in the study. When we write about the study or publish a
paper to share the research with other researchers, we will write about the combined information
we have gathered. We will not include your name or any information that will directly identify
you. We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing
that you gave us information, or what that information is. However, some people might review or
copy our records that may identify you in order to make sure we are following the required rules,
laws, and regulations. For example, the DePaul University Institutional Review Board may audit
the files. If they look at our records, they will keep your information confidential.
Who should be contacted for more information about the research?
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any
questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or
complaints about the study or you want to get additional information or provide input about this
research, you can contact the researcher, Mary Keegin, mkeegin@depaul.edu or Dr. Stuhlmacher,
astuhlma@depaul.edu, 773-325-2050 in the Psychology department of DePaul University.
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This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review Board (IRB). If
you have questions about your rights as a research subject you may contact Susan Loess-Perez,
DePaul University’s Director of Research Compliance, in the Office of Research Services at 312362-7593 or by email at sloesspe@depaul.edu.
You may also contact DePaul’s Office of Research Services if:
•
•
•

Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team.
You cannot reach the research team.
You want to talk to someone besides the research team.

You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.
Statement of Consent from the Subject:
I have read the above information. I have had all my questions and concerns answered. By signing
below, I indicate my consent to be in the research.
Signature:_______________________________________________

Printed name: ____________________________________________

Date: _________________

ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH – Non-Research Pool
Starting a New Job Study
Principal Investigator: Mary Keegin, M.A., Graduate Student
Institution: DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, USA
Department (School, College): Psychology, College of Science and Health
Faculty Advisor: Alice Stuhlmacher, Ph.D., Psychology, College of Science and Health
What is the purpose of this research?
We are asking you to be in a research study because we are trying to learn more about how people
interact when discussing terms of employment such as salary. This study is being conducted by
Mary Keegin, M.A., a graduate student at DePaul University as a requirement to obtain her
Doctoral degree. This research is being supervised by her faculty advisor, Alice Stuhlmacher,
Ph.D. There may be other people on the research team assisting with the study.
We hope to include about 130 people in the research.
Why are you being asked to be in the research?
You are invited to participate in this study because you can speak, read, and write fluently in English.
You must be age 18 or older to be in this study. This study is not approved for the enrollment of
people under the age of 18.
What is involved in being in the research study?

77

If you agree to be in this study, being in the research involves engaging in a salary negotiation as a
specific type of interaction. We are interested in people’s behavior and how they perceive
themselves and others in these situations.
This is the procedure for the study.
• First, you will complete a questionnaire on a computer that contains items asking about
your life experiences and how confident you are using different tactics in negotiations.
• Next, you will read detailed instructions and information concerning a salary negotiation
and your priorities taking on the role of a job candidate. You will be asked to plan your
strategy and write it down for review by the research team.
• After this, you will complete a questionnaire on a computer about your planned goals and
expectations of your counterpart.
• Then you will negotiate with your counterpart in person, who is another student taking on
the role of a hiring manager.
• Finally, you will receive another questionnaire on a computer that will ask your about
your experiences from the negotiation in terms of how satisfied you felt with your
outcomes, how the negotiation process went, how your counterpart behaved, how
confident you feel following the negotiation, your perceptions of your counterpart, and
demographic items (gender, ethnicity, age, and previous negotiation experience).
Importantly, all data in this study will be kept confidential. Your name will not be stored in a way
that can be linked to the data. Furthermore, all data will only be used for research purposes. You
have been randomly assigned (with a random number generator) to one of two groups. In order to
not influence you before or during the negotiation, we will tell you more about the different
conditions at the end of the experiment.
How much time will this take?
This study will take about 60 minutes of your time in total.
•
•
•

The first part of the study, which includes the questionnaires, reading the negotiation
instructions, and planning your strategy, will take approximately 30 minutes.
You will have time to negotiate with your counterpart for up to 15 minutes.
The final set of questionnaire items will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.

Are there any risks involved in participating in this study?
Being in this study does not involve any risks other than what you would encounter in daily life.
As in your daily interactions, you may feel unsure about the best course of action in negotiating or
uncomfortable about answering certain questions. You do not have to answer any question you do
not want to.
Are there any benefits to participating in this study?
You will not personally benefit from participating in this study.
We hope that what we learn will help other researchers, negotiators, employees, and policy makers
in improving equity in salary negotiations.
Is there any kind of payment, reimbursement or credit for being in this study?
You will receive $10 as an Amazon gift card for completing the study.
Are there any costs to me for being in the research?
You are responsible for any costs related to getting to and from the location where you will
participate in the research.
Can you decide not to participate?
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Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate. There will be no
negative consequences, penalties, or loss of benefits if you decide not to participate or change your
mind later and withdraw from the research after you begin participating. Your decision whether or
not to be in the research will not affect your standing with DePaul University.
Who will see my study information and how will the confidentiality of the information collected
for the research be protected?
The research records will be kept and stored securely. Your information will be combined with
information from other people taking part in the study. When we write about the study or publish a
paper to share the research with other researchers, we will write about the combined information
we have gathered. We will not include your name or any information that will directly identify
you. We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing
that you gave us information, or what that information is. However, some people might review or
copy our records that may identify you in order to make sure we are following the required rules,
laws, and regulations. For example, the DePaul University Institutional Review Board may audit
the files. If they look at our records, they will keep your information confidential.
Who should be contacted for more information about the research?
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any
questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or
complaints about the study or you want to get additional information or provide input about this
research, you can contact the researcher, Mary Keegin, mkeegin@depaul.edu or Dr. Stuhlmacher,
astuhlma@depaul.edu, 773-325-2050 in the Psychology department of DePaul University.
This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review Board (IRB). If
you have questions about your rights as a research subject you may contact Susan Loess-Perez,
DePaul University’s Director of Research Compliance, in the Office of Research Services at 312362-7593 or by email at sloesspe@depaul.edu.
You may also contact DePaul’s Office of Research Services if:
•
•
•

Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team.
You cannot reach the research team.
You want to talk to someone besides the research team.

You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.
Statement of Consent from the Subject:
I have read the above information. I have had all my questions and concerns answered. By signing
below, I indicate my consent to be in the research.
Signature:_______________________________________________

Printed name: ____________________________________________

Date: _________________
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Appendix B. Confederate Script and Payoff Table
Confederate Script – Starting a New Job Study
Instructions:
Introduce yourself to the participant.
You should try to elicit a first offer from the participant; say “I would like to start by hearing you
discuss your desired starting salary.”
Confederate hiring managers will always open with the same starting offer of $55,000 (no
justification), but ONLY IF participants are exceptionally resistant to making the first offer.
If the counterpart asks for justification about your initial offer, reply “This is the standard starting
salary for this position at A&B Inc.”
First counter-offer
1.

If the participant immediately counters with no justification, ask:

“Can you tell me a little bit more about why you think our company would benefit from paying
you that amount?”
2.
If the counterpart counters with a legitimate justification (see examples on next page),
make a concession to $58,000.
Concede $2,000 if participants require prompting for a legitimate justification
If the participant asks you for justification based on your counter-offer, reply “A&B Inc. has a
salary range they are willing to offer new hires in this position, and I think this amount is fair
given that you are a recent college graduate with little previous work experience.”
Remaining counter-offers
3.
If the participant justifies their previous offer with the same justification (no elaboration
or additional details) or a justification that is mixed or irrelevant (e.g., needing to pay off
their debts), resist them.
a.
For subsequent counter-offers where the participant provides a new, legitimate
justification, increase the offer by $2,000.
4.
If the participant does NOT provide justification or any other reasoning, or simply
reiterates the previous offer, state
“I’d like to hear why you feel you’re worth $X (whatever the participant’s offer is)”.
If, after prompting, the participant provides justification, increase the offer by $1,000.
For subsequent counter-offers with NO justification, resist the offer. Then, prompt the participant
about why they feel they are worth that amount and increase the offer by $1,000 only if they
continue providing reasonable justifications or they elaborate on previous justifications (i.e., not
just “because that’s what I want”).
First Offer
With justification

$3,000
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Justifies after prompting

$2,000
Remaining Offers

Legitimate justification

$2,000

Justifies after prompting OR
reiterates same justification,
with additional detail

$1,000

Reiterates same justification (no
additional detail)

Resist

Mixed justification

Resist

Irrelevant justification

Resist

Responses to various justifications
Utilize at least two of these responses (not listed in any particular order) to resist the participant’s
continued counter-offers:
Legitimate Participant Justifications

Confederate Response

·

Graduated from prestigious university

·
We adjust our offers based on the cost of
living in the area

·

High cost of living expenses

·
We usually re-negotiate your pay after the
first year depending on good performance
(AVOID)

·

Heard of offers up to $70k

·
Offers are made based on the market value
and what competitors in the area are offering

·

Increased job commitment/satisfaction

·
A&B Inc. expects that you will have an
excellent opportunity to launch your career at
this salary

·
Feels market value is higher than what is
being offered

·
I am required by A&B Inc. to agree to
salaries within specific ranges for new
employees at your level

·
Has received a job offer from another
organization

·
I just don’t know if that salary accurately
reflects your level of education and previous
experience

Examples of illegitimate participant justifications:
·
Something they make up that is unrelated to job-relevant skills or experience (e.g., childcare
expenses, health issues and related expenses)
·
Based on their information, but is not job-related (e.g., need to pay off their debt)
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Appendix C. Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Higgins et al., 2001)
Event Reaction Questionnaire
Instructions: This set of questions asks you how frequently specific events
actually occur or have occurred in your life.

1.

Compared to most people, are you
typically unable to get what you
want out of life?
1
2
3
4
5
never
sometimes
very
or seldom
often

7.

Do you often do well at different things
that you try?
1
2
3
4
5
never
sometimes
very often
or seldom

2.

Growing up, would you ever “cross
the line” by doing things that your
parents would not tolerate?
1
2
3
4
5
never
sometimes
very often
or seldom
How often have you accomplished
things that got you "psyched" to
work even harder?
1
2
3
4
5
never
sometimes
very often
or seldom

8.

Not being careful enough has gotten me
into trouble at times.
1
2
3
4
5
never
sometimes
very often
or seldom

9.

When it comes to achieving things that
are important to me, I find that I don't
perform as well as I ideally would like
to do.
1
2
3
4
5
never
sometimes
very
true
true
true

4.

Did you get on your parents’ nerves
often when you were growing up?
1
2
3
4
5
never
sometimes
very often
or seldom

10.

I feel like I have made progress toward
being successful in my life.
1
2
3
4
5
certainly
certainly
false
true

5.

How often did you obey rules and
regulations that were established by
your parents?
1
2
3
4
5
never
sometimes very often
or seldom

11.

I have found very few hobbies or
activities in my life that capture my
interest or motivate me to put effort into
them.
1
2
3
4
5
certainly
certainly
false
true

6.

Growing up, did you ever act in
ways that your parents thought were
objectionable?
1
2
3
4
5
never
sometimes
very often
or seldom

3.
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Appendix D. Negotiation Self-Efficacy Scale (Sullivan et al., 2006)

Instructions: Please rate the extent to which you feel confident you could enact
the following behaviors in the upcoming negotiation on a scale of 0=not confident
at all to 100=completely confident.

1. Persuade the other negotiator to make most of the concessions.
2. Convince the other negotiator to agree with you.
3. Gain the upper hand against the other negotiator.
4. Prevent the other negotiator from exploiting your weaknesses.
5. Establish rapport with the other negotiator.
6. Find tradeoffs with the other negotiator.
7. Exchange concessions with the other negotiator.
8. Maximize the interests of the other negotiator and yourself.
*First 4 items constitute Distributive Self-Efficacy and the last 4 make up
Integrative Self-Efficacy
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Appendix E. Negotiation Simulation and Regulatory Strategy Prime
(adapted from Galinsky et al. 2002)
Instructions: You will have ten minutes to read through the information
concerning the upcoming negotiation and prepare a strategy.
You are taking on the role of a job candidate that is finalizing the terms of
employment with an organization, A&B Inc., from whom you have received a job
offer. You are a recent graduate of a prestigious university and already have an
offer from another well-respected organization in your field with a starting salary
of $55,000. You are very interested in negotiating for a starting salary of at least
$60,000 since you must pay for living expenses that are higher in the city where
the A&B Inc. is located, and you are trying to pay off your debt within five years
by making higher payments per month. You have also recently heard that salaries
of up to $70,000 have been offered to others in your field.
Today, you will get fifteen minutes to negotiate with A&B Inc.’s hiring manager
about your starting salary. Think about your goal for the upcoming negotiation by
identifying your target value (i.e., the salary you would ideally like to settle on),
your reservation value (i.e., the lowest salary you would be willing to agree to),
and your aspiration value (i.e., the highest salary you feel the hiring manager
would still agree to).
Eagerness Strategy:
Negotiators also use strategies to prepare and to negotiate. Today you will
use an eagerness strategy. To do this, think about the different ways you could
maximize your gains in the negotiation. You are asked to concentrate on the
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highest salary you could attain. Therefore, during the negotiation, you should
focus your efforts on attaining a salary of $70,000, or the highest salary you have
heard of someone attaining at your level of experience in your field. Your strategy
can include specific offers or behaviors you think are effective depending on how
you expect your counterpart to behave.
Think about how you could apply this strategy and briefly describe your
strategy using the space provided. Feel free to use another sheet of paper to write
notes if you'd like.
Control Condition: Negotiators use strategies to prepare and to negotiate.
Strategies can include specific offers or behaviors you think are effective
depending on how you expect your counterpart to behave. Consider referencing
your target value, reservation value, and aspiration value when creating your
strategy.
Think about how you could apply your strategy and briefly describe your
strategy using the space provided. Feel free to use another sheet of paper to write
notes if you'd like.
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Appendix F. Manipulation Check Items and Anticipated Backlash

Perceived Fit (Appelt & Higgins, 2009)
Instructions: Please rate the extent to which you view the upcoming negotiation
as a chance to:

1. Create value
2. Minimize losses
3. Attain resources
4. Maintain resources

7 point Likert-type scale (1= “Strongly Disagree”, 7= “Strongly Agree”)

Anticipated Backlash (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010)
Instructions: Based on the instructions for your role in the upcoming negotiation,
please indicate a dollar value in reaction to the following items:

1. How much do you think you can reasonably ask for without the hiring
manager’s perceiving you to be a pushy person?
2. How much do you think you can reasonably ask for without causing the
hiring manager to punish you for being too demanding?
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Appendix G. Subjective Value Inventory (Curhan et al., 2006)

General Instructions: For each question, please circle a number from 1-7 that
most accurately reflects your opinion. You will notice that some of the questions
are similar to one another; this is primarily to ensure the validity and reliability of
the questionnaire. Please simply answer each question independently, without
reference to any of the other questions.

Important: If you encounter a particular question that is not applicable to your
negotiation, simply circle “NA.” Even if you did not reach agreement, please try
to answer as many questions as possible.

Instrumental Outcome
1. How satisfied are you with your own outcome—i.e., the extent to which the
terms of your agreement (or lack of agreement) benefit you?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
Not at
Moderately
Perfectly
all
2. How satisfied are you with the balance between your own outcome and your
counterpart(s)’s outcome(s)?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
Not at
Moderately
Perfectly
all
3. Did you feel like you forfeited or “lost” in this negotiation?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
Not at
Moderately
A great
all
deal
4. Do you think the terms of your agreement are consistent with principles of
legitimacy or objective criteria (e.g., common standards of fairness, precedent,
industry practice, legality, etc.)?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
Not at
Moderately
Perfectly
all
Self
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5. Did you “lose face” (i.e., damage your sense of pride) in the negotiation?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
Not at
Moderately
A great
all
deal
6. Did this negotiation make you feel more or less competent as a negotiator?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
It made
It did not
It made
me feel
make me
me feel
less
feel more
more
competent
or less
competent
competent
7. Did you behave according to your own principles and values?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
Not at
Moderately
Perfectly
all
8. Did this negotiation positively or negatively impact your self-image (your
impression of yourself)?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
It
It did not
It
negatively
positively
positively
impacted
or
impacted
my selfnegatively
my selfimage
impact
image
my selfimage
Process
9. Do you feel your counterpart(s) listened to your concerns?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
Not at
Moderately
Perfectly
all
10. Would you characterize the negotiation process as fair?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
Not at
Moderately
Perfectly
all
11. How satisfied are you with the ease (or difficulty) of reaching an agreement?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
Not at all
Moderately
Perfectly
satisfied
satisfied
satisfied
12. Did your counterpart(s) consider your wishes, opinions, or needs?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
Not at
Moderately
Perfectly
all
Relationship
13. What kind of “overall” impression did your counterpart(s) make on you?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
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Extremely
negative

Neither
Extremely
negative
positive
nor
positive
14. How satisfied are you with your relationship with your counterpart(s) as a
result of this negotiation?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
Not at
Moderately
Perfectly
all
15. Did the negotiation make you trust your counterpart(s)?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
Not at
Moderately
Perfectly
all
16. Did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship with your
counterpart(s)?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NA
Not at
Moderately
Perfectly
all
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Appendix H. Experienced Backlash (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013)

Instructions: Please use the following scale to rate these items:

1= “Not at all”

2

3

4

5

6

7= “Extremely”

1. How interested would you be in working with your counterpart at
[organization]?
2. If you were the project manager on a work assignment, how likely would
you be to ask your counterpart to be part of the project team?
3. Is your counterpart the type of person you like to work with?
4. How interested would you be in interacting socially with your
counterpart?
5. If your counterpart invited you out for a fun activity after work, how likely
would you be to go with her/him?
6. Is your counterpart the type of person you like to socialize with?
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Appendix I. Demographic Items

1. What is your gender? Male=0, Female=1
2. What is your ethnicity? White=1, Black/African American=2, Hispanic=3,
Asian=4, Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander=5, Two or more races=6
3. What is your age? Continuous numerical response
4. Please rate the extent to which you have previous experience in
negotiations. 1=“No previous experience”, 2=“Little experience”,
3=“Some experience”, 4=“Quite a bit of experience”, or 5=“Extensive
experience”
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Appendix J. Participant Debriefing Information
Debriefing Information
The purpose of the present study is to test an intervention to reduce gender differences in salary
negotiation outcomes, and examine other factors that may impact the effectiveness of the
intervention. For example, one of our hypotheses states that priming individuals to view a salary
negotiation in gain framing terms (e.g., viewing the negotiation as an opportunity rather than an
obligation), or a “promotion focus”, may reduce previously observed gender differences in salary
negotiations. Specifically, we are interested in examining how women may improve their salary
negotiation outcomes and feel more satisfied with their negotiated outcomes if they are primed to
adopt a promotion focus in a salary negotiation compared to a control group.
We randomly assigned participants to a neutral condition or a priming condition for regulatory
focus, where individuals in the neutral condition simply developed a strategy of any kind for
achieving their desired salary, and individuals in the priming (or “promotion focus”) condition
developed a specific strategy aimed at framing the negotiation in terms of gains to maximize their
final negotiated salary.
We also used deception in this research. You were told you were negotiating with another student
taking on the role of the hiring manager in the negotiation. You were actually negotiating with a
trained confederate. We did not inform you of this prior to the negotiation in order to remove the
possibility that your behavior and responses to survey items would be impacted by this knowledge
in a way that would confound the experimental manipulation.
We hope that this research will aid in establishing support for recommendations to organizations,
individuals, and policy makers to improve salary negotiation equity. Your participation is greatly
needed and appreciated in order for this to be accomplished. We ask that you do not share the
details of the study with other individuals who may participate in order to ensure the accuracy and
honesty of the responses.
You no doubt understand that it is important to have a similar environment for everyone who
participates in the study. Because of this, we ask your help in not revealing information about this
study to others who may be involved or might participate in this study in the future. This is very
important so that we are able to compare across people and so participants enter the study with the
same information.
If you would like to know more information about the theories supporting the present research, see
the following published research articles, available to current DePaul students through PsychInfo
on the library website:
Mazei, J., Hüffmeier, J., Freund, P. A., Stuhlmacher, A. F., Bilke, L., & Hertel, G. (2015). A metaanalysis on gender differences in negotiation outcomes and their
moderators. Psychological Bulletin, 141(1), 85.
Rudman, L. A., Moss-Racusin, C. A., Glick, P., & Phelan, J. E. (2012). 4 reactions to vanguards:
Advances in backlash theory. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 167-226.
If you want a paper copy of this debriefing, please ask the experimenter. If you would like to know
more information or have any questions about the research, feel free to contact the primary
investigator on the project:
Mary M. Keegin, M.A.
Doctoral Candidate
2219 N. Kenmore Ave.
Chicago, IL 60614
(616)-502-8742
mkeegin@depaul.edu
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Figure 1. Main effect of strategy on final negotiated salary
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Figure 2. Main effect of strategy on first offer
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Figure 3. Interaction of gender and strategy on final negotiated salary
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Figure 4. Interaction of gender and strategy on first offer
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